WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/3/2015 2:56 PM

Shared Spatial Regulating in Sharing-Economy
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ABSTRACT
Digital technology, coupled with present economic conditions and the
interest of younger Americans in sustainability, has enabled a climate favorable
to collaborative consumption. More individuals will be engaged over time in
the on-demand “sharing economy” because underemployment of the middle
class, and a majority of all non- or under-skilled workers, is a chronic condition
eluding ready solution. This new resources “lending” and social networking
culture assures ongoing introductions of sharing producers and consumers to
each other and into residential neighborhoods. The result of such engagement
will include increased traffic trips, overtaxed curbside parking spaces,
additional ambient noise and enhanced stress upon electric and other utility
grids tapped by sharing enterprises. Since these neighborhood burdens are not
addressed in the form of sales taxes or license fees directly returned to host
enclaves, many of these burdens are borne largely by dwellers. Local persons not
participating in the sharing economy expect their daily routines to continue
without interference from unfamiliar persons, noises and odors, or the
disadvantages of increased traffic and reduced curbside parking.
Communities now are challenged to regulate sharing uses in this new
economic order while accommodating opportunities for such enterprises to
generate revenue and taxes. In one regard, accommodation invites struggles
between established neighborhood dwellers and later-arriving sharing producers
operating outside zoning regulations. Even so, outright prohibiting of
entrepreneurial models in residential zoning districts counters local
governments’ efforts to remake the economic and social landscapes of urban
communities, especially those mired precariously in circumstances of joblessness,
crime and other types of disorder. Many sharing economy voices argue that
today’s good land use decisions mandate subordinating neighborhood
inconvenience to this new business climate’s benefit to the larger community, the
“greater good.” This is the first paper in American academic legal literature
addressing how communities might accept this challenge to accommodate the
new economy, productively modernizing governmental spatial regulatory
prerogatives through incorporating crucial citizen inputs at this land use
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Does your neighbor rent out his or her apartment or condo shortterm through Airbnb, Inc. without violating the local zoning code?1
Why not rent out space in your single-family home—is that permitted
Classic (Euclidean) zoning codes
in your neighborhood?2
*Adjunct Professor, Arizona Summit Law School; Zoning Adjustment Hearing Officer,
City of Phoenix; Of Counsel, Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C. This is for
Peggy, with gratitude for sharing our lives and love. Unfamiliar terms contained in
this paper likely are defined in the Lexicon appearing at the end.
1
See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 52 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2015). Professor Miller’s fine treatment highlights positive
and negative externalities of the transient lodging Sharing Enterprise niche.
2
This has occurred for decades in some communities, in violation of many

WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

SHARED SPATIAL REGULATING

11/3/2015 2:56 PM

113

purposefully draw sharp distinctions between land uses, permitting
some types in certain districts3 while discriminating against remaining
uses either by outright prohibition or imposing expensive or
inconvenient constraints. Depending on the community, such codes
may or may not accommodate flexibility of residentially-zoned activity.4
The demographics of cities are changing, and a population increase in
young, single workers already has impacted housing stock, illustrated
by evolution of the micro-dwelling unit.5 While this “bolt-on” housing
accommodation type initially may have been intended to move elderly
family members back with relatives,6 these units become fertile sources
of steady income when let to younger professional workers or short
term travelers.7 Yet some communities lament occupancy of these
units by unknown persons.8

zoning regulations, in the form of home rentals in environments of major events such
as professional golf tournaments or the Super Bowl. See, e.g., Laurie Merrill, Super Bowl
Home Rental Prices Soar in Phoenix Area, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 11, 2014 5:45 PM),
http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/2014/08/11/super-bowl-homerental-prices-soar-in-phoenix-area/13896283/; Meg Mirshak, Augusta Homeowners Earn
Big on Masters Week Rentals, THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (Feb. 25, 2012),
http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/business/local-business/2012-02-25/augustahomeowners-earn-big-masters-week-rentals.
3
For instance, some classic “sharing economy” activities of the charitable sort,
such as food and clothing banks, are specified permitted uses in some districts. Also,
“sharing” uses and activities, such as boarding houses, group homes and yard sales, are
addressed by specific zoning ordinance provisions, as they have been for decades,
often as the subject of conditional use permits. See, e.g., Conditional Use Permit
(CUP), CITY OF TACOMA, http://www.govme.com/Common/Doc/DisplayDoc.aspx?
category=TipSheet&id=P-111 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
4
For the most part, segregation of uses continues to dominate American zoning
schemes, even in New Urbanist communities where modest-scale commercial uses are
“zoned out.” See Miller, supra note 1, at 17 n.70.
5
See Vicki Been, Benjamin Gross & John Infranca, Responding to Changing
Households: Regulatory Challenges for Micro-Units and Accessory Dwelling Units, NYU FURMAN
CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE AND URBAN POLICY 8–10 (Jan. 2014),
http://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_RespondingtoChangingHouseh
olds_2014_1.pdf.
6
See John Infranca, Housing Changing Households: Regulatory Challenges for MicroUnits and Accessory Dwelling Units, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 64–65 (2014), available
at
http://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-law-policyreview/print/2014/01/infranca_25_stan._l._poly_rev_53.pdf; The Other Boomerang
Generation, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2014, 11:41 AM), http://www.wsj.com/video/theother-boomerang-generation/DC079F2C-72D9-441F-92187E01121BAC58.html?mod=wsj_email_newsletter.
7
See Infranca, supra note 6, at 61 (noting that micro-units may not provide
affordable housing but may exacerbate high community rental rates).
8
See id. at 62–63 (discussing how opponents state fears of flooding
neighborhoods with itinerant or “sketchy” dwellers).
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Another example of a sharing economy model9 is the “pop-up
family dinner,” where strangers share a table and prepared food.10 Are
local land use regulations flexible enough to contemplate meal
sharing (outside of social, gratuitous settings where the diners know
their hosts)? What about bicycle,11 motorcycle or even car12 or parking-

9

To skirt utter definitional confusion, I acknowledge here the work of Lawrence
Lessig, who perhaps would view this illustration as exemplifying what he calls the
“hybrid economy,” existing when “a commercial entity . . . aims to leverage value from
a sharing economy, or . . . a sharing economy that builds a commercial entity to better
support its sharing aims.” Either way, the hybrid links two simpler, or purer,
economies and produces something from the link. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX:
MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY, 177–78 (2008). Lessig’s
definition of a sharing economy, in purest form, is one not involving an actor’s
engagement in generating revenue. See id. at 118–19, 152–54. Of course, most of
today’s references to “the sharing economy” in the tech world conflate informationsharing and money-making, so long as revenue is spread among the “vendors,” with
business-model entrepreneurs reaping a percentage of the sums paid by consumers
for the goods and services offered by sharing producers.
10
See Amy Lombard, Five Noteworthy Startups from TechCrunch Disrupt NY, TIME
INNOVATION BLOG (May 2, 2013), http://techland.time.com/2013/05/02/fivenoteworthy-startups-from-techcrunch-disrupt-ny/slide/eatwith-airbnb-for-therestaurant-industry/ (describing EatWith, a sharing cuisine site); competition in this
space already includes With Locals (www.withlocals.com) and KitchHike
(https://en.kitchhike.com/). There is a non-tech element to this and other types of
sharing entrepreneurship models that can be overlooked due to “sub-radar” scale and
skirting of local regulatory requirements. See Scott Beyer, The Motor City’s Regulators Are
Hitting the Brakes on Regrowth, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2014, at A13, available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/scott-beyer-the-motor-citys-regulators-are-hitting-thebrakes-on-regrowth-1418426736. It is short-sighted to welcome some forms of Sharing
Enterprises that are better-financed while repressing “self-help” activities that mean
economic survival for their actors, so long as certain minimum health and safety
standards are observed by the sharing producers; the trick is finding the sensible
balance affording participants public safety (e.g., avoidance of food-borne illness),
entrepreneurial opportunity and community building settings. See Sarah Schindler,
Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-Up Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 16, 27–29, 35 (2015), available at https://
lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Schindler_Dial
ogue.pdf.
11
See Jeremy Rifkin, Op-Ed., The Rise of the Sharing Economy, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 6,
2014),
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/apr/06/opinion/la-oe-rifkin-airbnb20140406 (“[A]n increasing number of young people are deciding they don’t need to
own bikes; they are perfectly happy to have access to shared bikes, and pay only for the
time they use them.”).
12
According to Rifkin, “1.7 million people globally are members of car-sharing
services. A recent survey found that the number of vehicles owned by car-sharing
participants decreased by half after joining the service, with members preferring access
over ownership.” See Jeremy Rifkin, The Rise of Anti-Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2014, at SR4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/opinion/sunday/therise-of-anti-capitalism.html?_r=0.
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space13 sharing by persons on a sole-proprietor scale?14 Will 3D
printing and other additive manufacturing techniques15 be enabled or
hindered by zoning codes, authorizing equipment sharing in
residential and other spaces not zoned for “compounding of materials”
13

See PARKING PANDA, https://www.parkingpanda.com/how-it-works (last visited
Sept. 11, 2015),(allowing advance parking reservation from computers or in real-time
from mobile phones).
14
The sole proprietors with “one off” or micro-scale operations (think of single
person web-page designing for barter, for instance) are seemingly undetectable,
therefore ungovernable in the literal sense. Thus, this sharing economy is replete with
“outliers,” exploiting new norms imbedded in this collaborative environment (as is
true in any other form of economy); but they defy easy identification. See Dana
Sauchelli and Bruce Golding, Hookers Turning Airbnb Apartments into Brothels, N.Y. POST
(Apr. 14, 2014, 2:19 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/04/14/hookers-using-airbnb-touse-apartments-for-sex-sessions/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&
utm_term=NYP%20180%20Day%20Openers%20and%2030%20Day%20Signups&ut
m_campaign=NY%2520Post%2520Newsletter. It seems likely that criminal justice
systems will be more likely these outliers’ interface if any with government
regulation.
15
See generally, STEPHEN HOSKINS, 3D PRINTING FOR ARTISTS, DESIGNERS AND MAKERS:
TECHNOLOGY CROSSING ART AND INDUSTRY (2014). Nanotechnology will be the next
breakthrough in home-scale production. See, e.g., K. ERIC DREXLER, RADICAL
ABUNDANCE: HOW A REVOLUTION IN NANOTECHNOLOGY WILL CHANGE CIVILIZATION 77,
156 (2013) (discussing when this technology’s equipment becomes affordable,
products of modest size will be makeable from home on machines as small as desktop
printers, using open-source digital design files). It may be closer than intuition
suggests. See Junqi Li, Steven G. Ballmer, Eric P. Gillis, Seiko Fujii, Michael J. Schmidt,
Andrea M. E. Palazzolo, Jonathan W. Lehmann, Greg F. Morehouse, and Martin D.
Burke, Synthesis of Many Different Types of Organic Small Molecules Using One Automated
Process, 347 SCIENCE 1221 (2015). Another breakthrough is the continuous liquid
interface production (CLIP) process; continuous curing promises a quantum leap in
additive production speed. See Rising from the Ooze, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 17, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21646537-quicker-wayprint-objects-rising-ooze. Those scoffing at the possibility of “citizen craftsmen”
manufacturing from dwellings at the molecular level should recall that in only a few
years’ time, 3D printing venues morphed from research laboratories to dwellings, as
equipment became smaller and affordable to everyday citizens. See, e.g., IAN GIBSON,
DAVID ROSEN & BRENT STUCKER, ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGIES: 3D
PRINTING, RAPID PROTOTYPING, AND DIRECT DIGITAL MANUFACTURING 33, 42, 171, 299–
300, 482–85 (2015). Scant economic reason exists for rejecting a means to restore
competitiveness to the nation and jobs to the “digi-proneurship” segment of the
public. Cf. id. at 39, 385, 484. Gartner projects global end-user spending on the seven
technologies constituting the 3D printer market will reach $13.4 billion by 2018,
although it is unclear whether those users will have sufficient revenue to cover not only
their production and overhead costs but also service, sales and channel development.
See Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide Shipments of 3D Printers to Reach
More than 217,000 in 2015 (Oct. 27, 2014), available at http://www.gartner.com/
newsroom/id/2887417. In the meantime, 3D printing service bureaus serve the
production needs of developers, such as Shapeways. See Steve Rosenbush, 3-D Printing,
Cloud Converge in New Business Services, WALL ST. J. CIO JOURNAL (May 26, 2015, 12:26
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/05/26/3-d-printing-cloud-converge-in-newbusiness-services/?mod=WSJ_TechWSJD_cioJournal.
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and, for that matter, sharing the manufacturing spaces themselves
among “makers?”16
Sharing entrepreneurs generally desire to operate around shared
tools and technologies. So-called “maker spaces” attract such
providers; and their proximity to each other pays some dividends to
the community due to synergies among ideas and economies of scale.
But such spaces under Euclidean-grounded codes often are termed
“manufacturing” or similar industrial-based uses violating earlier
conventions separating blue-collar operations from residential, retail
and other “cleaner” commercial activities. An initial paradox in
attempting to assert land use controls over sharing entrepreneurs is
this: Zoning law fundamentally seeks predictability in land regulation
through structured lists of permitted uses in defined “districts” within
its jurisdiction;17 but the sharing economy experiments continuously
16

Artisan’s Asylum in Sommerville, MA, a 40,000 square foot, multi-tenant,
community “maker space” thrives in a town in which its zoning code salubriously allows
light industrial uses next to residential areas. See Juliet B. Schor, After the Jobs Disappear,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/15/opinion/after-thejobs-disappear.html?pagewanted=all; David Lang, Kickstarted: Finding Space (and
Making
a
Makerspace),
MAKE BLOG
(Oct.
15,
2012,
4:06
PM),
http://makezine.com/2012/10/15/kickstarted-finding-space-and-making-a-maker
space/. A “makerspace” is defined as a community center combining manufacturing
equipment, community and education for the purposes of enabling community
members to design, prototype and fabricate manufactured works impossible to create
with the resources available to individuals working alone. These spaces of
independent individuals sharing space and tools, can be hosted by for-profit
companies, non-profit corporations, or organizations affiliated with or hosted within
schools, universities or libraries. “Makerspaces represent the democratization of
design, engineering, fabrication and education.” How to Make a Makerspace,
EVENTBRITE, http://www.eventbrite.com/e/how-to-make-a-makerspace-registration4585453214 (last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
17
Readers familiar with “form-based codes” stemming from New Urbanism
principles may protest that these codes address the conflict of values described in this
Article, but this assertion is incorrect beyond “optics.” Form-based codes vary in type
and extent, but generally place less emphasis on use as the basis for a code; instead,
they “foster predictable built results and a high-quality public realm by using physical
form (rather than separation of uses) as the organizing principle for the code.” See
Form-Based Codes Defined, FORM-BASED CODES INSTITUTE, “FORM-BASED CODES DEFINED,”
http://formbasedcodes.org/definition (last visited Sept. 11, 2015). Form-based codes
encourage a variety of uses to be located near one another, but in a way that attempts
to ensure they work well together and maintain a desired community character.
Implicitly, then, the actual form and aesthetics of the area, engaging a mix of uses both
attractive and walkable, creates cohesion and a somewhat-predictable neighborhood
appearance. See Richard S. Geller, The Legality of Form-Based Zoning Codes, 26 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL L. 36, 53 (2010). Form-based codes’ ability to create “visual harmony in
the public realm,” “continuous urban frontage to ensure a degree of uniformity,” and
control over spatial relationships in the built environment makes them useful
governance tools. See FORM-BASED CODES INSTITUTE, supra note 17; Emily Talen, Design
by the Rules: The Historical Underpinnings of Form-Based Codes, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 144,
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with assets and technology, disrupting established business models.
Indeed, some new Sharing Enterprise business models hardly
resemble business activities to the outsider.18 This results in less
predictability and an appearance that authorities and those governed
work at cross-purposes. Nimbleness and iterative development of
resource use are chief traits of sharing producers, foreign to the
relative formulaic operations of Euclidean zoning regimes. A related
paradox is that community land planning seemingly moves toward
increasingly regional authority, while in the rich environment of
sharing entrepreneurialism, the neighborhood19 appears a more
sensible unit for planning activity.
Transportation planning
particularly appears destined for greater regionalism, but what
happens within specific transit nodes increasingly seems destined to be
governed by smaller governance units than the municipality.20
Adherents of a movement toward a “New Science of Cities”21 assert
that understanding the intrinsic order of cities requires planners to
undertake and endorse others’ actions that create economic growth
from networks of proximity, casual encounters and their economic
“spillovers” in optimizing municipal performance.22 Any planning
action therefore should promote social interactions known as
knowledge exchanges, encouraging these economic spillovers.23
Advocates for social interaction find private infrastructure that
155–56 (2009). These codes do not, however, entirely eliminate separation of uses;
instead, they prescribe “building functions,” often in a simple matrix. See Geller, supra
note 17, at 36. The issues pertinent to this Article are the purposes to which building
interiors and surrounding streets of a neighborhood are put, and the resulting (often
adverse) effects on traffic and parking congestion.
18
See Matt Hickman, Outdoor Living Meets the Sharing Economy at UK’s First “ondemand” Garden Space, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK BLOG (Aug. 11, 2014),
http://www.mnn.com/your-home/organic-farming-gardening/blogs/outdoor-livingmeets-the-sharing-economy-at-uks-first-on (describing reservable “by the hour” private
garden spaces as an alternative to public park visitation in Manchester, England).
19
In this Article, I will refer often to a distinguishable neighborhood or cluster of
similarly situated (however organized for regulatory purposes) neighborhoods as a
“District,” meaning a designated local planning unit.
20
See Stephen R. Miller, Legal Neighborhoods, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 156–58
(2013).
21
See, e.g., Michael Mehaffy, 5 Key Themes Emerging from the “New Science of Cities,”
ATLANTIC CITYLAB BLOG (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/design/2014/09/5key-themes-emerging-from-the-new-science-of-cities/380233/; Michael Mehaffy, What
Can a “Science of Cities” Offer Planners?, PLANETIZEN (June 25, 2014, 5:00 PM),
http://www.planetizen.com/node/69957 [hereinafter “Mehaffy Planners”].
22
See Mehaffy Planners, supra note 21.
23
See id. Local governments intuitively would encourage the sharing economy
because it permits jurisdictionally-bound municipalities to grow their economies with
minimal infrastructure costs or annexation battles calculated to increase the tax base.
Miller, supra note 1, at 24.
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depends largely upon automobiles, telephones, and the Internet—
and the unsustainably high consumption of resources required to
maintain their operations—less resilient than a system of physical
urban place networks, whether public or semi-public spaces.24
Conventional planning, therefore, should abandon its focus on
architecture and objects (ensuring visual order) that rely upon
isolating, high resource-consumption systems and instead
implement walkable, connected public realms inducing casual
encounters among a wide network of acquaintances and strangers.25
This view endorses a certain magnitude of visual disorder in a
dynamic organism like the city.26
This purportedly “scientific” view of cities holds that optimal
performance follows ceding to residents some measure of land use
control of their spatial structure.27 Naturally, sharing producers
who wish to operate from their residences and “maker space”
locales will find this notion initially satisfying. 28 The balance of this
article addresses whether—and if so, how—to accommodate dwellers
while embracing scientifically-supported views that socio-economic
“reactors” like cities must promote efficient exchanges and creative
interactions among their citizens and visitors by accelerating physical
interaction rates. Part II below describes persons forming and
frequenting Sharing Enterprises and explains how the burgeoning
sharing economy impacts the neighborhood model as a residential
safe harbor from negative impacts typical of non-residential uses. Part
III argues that even saluting their commitments to values like
sustainability and trust demonstrated by most participants, unchecked
operation of Sharing Enterprises leads to distrust and conflict among
a neighborhood’s stakeholders. Part IV assesses alternatives for land
use governance of Sharing Enterprises and proposes an inclusive
model balancing various stakeholders’ agendas for their enclaves. Part
V disposes with claims that no land use administration of Sharing
Enterprises is optimal, while Part VI addresses how private land use
governance may contribute to creating détente among district
stakeholders. Part VII sums up why the sharing producer is not
destined to become a fleeting figure in the urban landscape and,
therefore, why minimizing the negative externalities of Sharing
24

See Mehaffy Planners, supra note 21.
See id.
26
See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 222–23, 382–84
(Vintage Ed., 1992).
27
See Mehaffy Planners, supra note 21.
28
But see infra text accompanying notes 169–77.
25
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Enterprises must be addressed by the local administrations to preserve
neighborhood
expectations
while
promoting
municipal
competitiveness. Governments’ special attention to defining a
neighborhood to preserve the local character of (and retaining those
“characters” who season) the urban fabric while driving high-value
knowledge workers and tourists into the enclave is a daunting task.29
The challenge involves a reinvention of regulation by joining citizens
and sharing producers as partners in flexible approaches to sharing
risks and rewards of integrating these enterprises into our
communities.
II. THE PARAMETERS OF THE SHARED ECONOMY MOVEMENT, AND ITS
SALUTARY FEATURES
A. Players in the Sharing Economy
Five categories (listed below) of participants on the “producer”
side populate the sharing economy.30 A permanent entrepreneurial
class consisting of persons hovering near economic subsistence is one
demographic constituent, remaining solvent by leveraging underused
personal assets to share with others.31 These assets will consist of
personal labor on a “one-off” hired basis and goods for loan like
dwelling rooms, personal motor vehicles, clothes, tools, works of art,
items of personal adornment and other expendable rental items.
Redeployment of these goods hedges against their owners’ economic
uncertainty by creating new revenue streams. While selling one’s
goods and services in this fashion is hardly unprecedented—think, for

29

See Miller, supra note 1, at 35.
The sharing economy has long-historic antecedents in the United States.
During the 17th and 18th Centuries, money (script) was scarce, so many colonists relied
primarily on bartering, with commodities such as beaver pelts, corn, musket balls,
nails, tobacco and deer skins (from which we get our modern slang, “buck,” meaning
“dollar”). Everyone schooled in America during the 20th Century learned of the
“barter deal” of all time reportedly made in 1626 by Peter Minuit with local Native
peoples, trading a valueless deed (Mana-hatin was not “titled” to any of the tribes) to
twenty-two square miles of island for goods allegedly worth about sixty guilders, or
$23.70 in those times. See L.J. KRIZNER, LISA SITA, PETER STUYVESANT: NEW AMSTERDAM
AND THE ORIGINS OF NEW YORK 38–41 (2001) (stating that at best, this quit-claim deed
deterred challenges by other native peoples to the “entitlements” of the New
Netherland colony).
31
See CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN, MATTHEW MITCHELL & ADAM THIERER, THE SHARING
ECONOMY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATION: THE CASE FOR POLICY CHANGE 4
(Dec. 2014).
30
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example, of boarding houses32 and car-pooling33—the magnitude of
voluntary collaborative consumption is unprecedented.
Conventional “yard sale” or eBay “merchant” models34 will not
cease; but there will be increasing emphasis on temporary ceding of an
asset’s use instead of permanent asset disposition. Sharing economy
activists assess their assets and skill sets in this uncertain fiscal
environment and unlock the value of their possessions and talents in
unprecedented ways, leveraging their personal resources for others
who gain by sharing in food, shelter, transportation, and other goods
and services, such as know-how, on an individualized basis.35 The
permanent sharing producer class will consist of a number of subsets,36
among them:
1. Senior citizens, retired on fixed incomes or their saved funds,
leveraging their outright-owned assets like spare rooms and
implements;37
2. Manually-skilled persons “moonlighting” from their
residences outside regular work hours, fabricating goods or
rendering services on their own time;38
3. Micro-jobbers in the “knowledge economy”39 working on a
32

See generally PAUL GROTH, LIVING DOWNTOWN: THE HISTORY OF RESIDENTIAL
HOTELS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1994).
33
See generally Selective History of Ridesharing, MIT “REAL-TIME” RIDESHARE RESEARCH
(Jan. 24, 2009), http://ridesharechoices.scripts.mit.edu/home/histstats/.
34
See generally eBay Merchant eCommerce Solutions Center, EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/merchantsolutions/whyebay/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
35
See Dara Kerr, Vexed in the City: The “Sharing Economy’s Hidden Toll on San
Francisco, CNET BLOG (Aug. 20, 2014 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/vexed-inthe-city-the-sharing-economys-hidden-toll-on-san-francisco/.
36
See, e.g., Leo Burnett, Meet the 6 Types of Sharers, HUMANS BEING
http://humansbeing.leoburnett.com/#/meet-the-6-types-of-sharers/ (last visited Feb.
26, 2015). Every sharing economy oriented website or paper endeavors to categorize
participants (producers, consumers and prosumers) in some manner. See, e.g.,
Collaborative Economy Honeycomb 2—Watch it Grow, JEREMIAH OWYANG (Dec. 7, 2014),
http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2014/12/07/collaborative-economyhoneycomb-2-watch-it-grow/ (noting twelve market sectors populated by Sharing
Enterprises).
37
See Rodney Brooks, Creative Ideas for Cash Flow in Retirement, USA TODAY, July 20,
2014, at 7B (illustrating revenue-generating options for dealing with shortfall in
seniors’ retirement funds).
38
Cf. Tamar Jacoby, This Way Up: Mobility in America, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2014, at
C1–2, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/this-way-up-mobility-in-america1405710779 (discussing how many future American jobs will require some sort of
technical or practical training that emphasizes skills excluding producing things
without manipulating computer programs).
39
See Knut Ingar Westeren, Introductory Comments to FOUNDATIONS OF THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, 1–2 (2012). In a knowledge economy, a significant part of a
business’ value may consist of its intangible assets, such as the value of workers’
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single-assignment basis as independent contractors from
home-office space or other remote “third spaces,” unaffiliated
with an employer other than on a “jobbing” basis”;40
4. “Makers” exploiting cutting-edge technology like additive
manufacturing devices (3D printers, for example),41 along
with more conventional artisans continuing to work from
home studios, renting their products from those spaces as
ersatz galleries;42 and
5. “Hustlers,” engaging in any income-producing method
defraying recurring expense of living in cities without reliable
means of financial support, including persons characterized
as chronically unemployed or underemployed.43
intellectual capability, especially regarding use and applications of technology in
producing and disseminating information. See Walter W. Powell & Kaisa Snellman,
The Knowledge Economy, 30 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 199, 199 (2004).
40
See Justin Fox, Breaking Down the Freelance Economy, HARV. BUS. REV.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Sept. 2, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/09/breaking-down-thefreelance-economy/.
41
See Michael N. Widener, Begone Euclid! Leasing Custom and Zoning Provision
Engaging Retail Consumer Tastes and Technologies in Thriving Urban Centers, 35 PACE L.
REV. 834, 857–59 (2015).
42
See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Fowler, MakerBot Replicator Mini Review: 3-D Printing Comes
Home, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2014, at D1–2, available at http://online.wsj.com
/articles/makerbot-replicator-mini-review-3-d-printing-comes-home-1403021932
(explaining how MakerBot Replicator Mini now enables persons to work from a
residence to create 3D objects). Local Motors, a Phoenix-based 3D-printing company
which built an entire automobile in 2014 with help from Oak Ridge National Lab and
the manufacturing company SABIC, says it is the first to 3D print both a body and
chassis (carbon fiber-reinforced plastic) together. Brian Fung, So, This Exists: A
Working Car Has Been 3D-Printed Out of Carbon Fiber Plastic, WASH. POST THE SWITCH BLOG
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/
09/19/so-this-exists-a-working-car-has-been-3d-printed-out-of-carbon-fiber-plastic/.
Even if one accepts the notion that such printing is twenty years away from everyday
citizens’ access for a variety of reasons (product safety, cost, etc.), it is naïve to insist
that large consumer products will not be built with the intention of shared use from
individual residences and garages as soon as price and competence permits
implementation.
43
See, e.g., Kevin Roose, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About Trust, It’s About Desperation,
NEW YORK DAILY INTELLIGENCER/THE GIG ECONOMY (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/04/sharing-economy-is-about-despera
tion.html. See also Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. (July 15, 2014), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen
201407
15a.htm
(Testimony of Janet L. Yellen, Chair of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.)
(“Even with the recent declines, the unemployment rate remains above Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) participants’ estimates of its longer-run normal level.
Labor force participation appears weaker than one would expect based on the aging
of the population and the level of unemployment.”). Some speculate that the
persistent weakness in the labor force participation rate reflects adults working in the
freelance economy. See Stephen Gandel, America’s Biggest Job Market Problem is Uniquely
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B. Principles of the Sharing Economy Movement
The central elements of the sharing economy are an emphasis on
sustainability and value creation through reuse of materials and
objects; underpinnings of trust between and among producers,
prosumers and consumers;44 and marketing of participants exploiting
Web 2.0 platforms45 combined with an element of self-policing to
evaluate and rate both providers and customers.46 Peer-to-peer
communications capitalizing on expanding access to technology using
open and collaborative design47 has spurred the idea that hospitality
and generosity with one’s costly privately-owned physical assets and
talents can expand exponentially, thereby conserving non-renewable
resources. Anthony Townsend muses that this is evidence of the
“sociability of cities,” propelled by the technologically-astute urban
dweller’s desire to connect, collaborate and share.48
The best argument for the essential sustainability of the sharing
economy is that bartering with one’s excess or underutilized—thus
disposable or loanable—resources49 represents centuries-old social
behavior. In America, sharing of resources is evident from the days of
American,
FORTUNE FINANCE
(July
2,
2015,
11:18
AM),
https://
fortune.com/2015/07/02/us-labor-force-participation-drops/. It is unknown how
many of such persons are paid in cash (or equivalents in goods or services) by others
without declaring cash income or in-kind payments. Chairwoman Yellen’s speech to
the National Association for Business Economics Policy Conference was more sobering
yet. See Janet L. Yellen, Chair, the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at
the 2013 National Association for Business Economics Policy Conference: Challenges
Confronting Monetary Policy (Mar. 4, 2013) (transcript available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20130302a. htm).
44
See Juliet B. Schor and Connor J. Fitzmaurice, Collaborating and Connecting: The
Emergence of the Sharing Economy, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON SUSTAINABLE
CONSUMPTION 410, 416–17 (Lucia A. Reisch and John Thogersen eds., 2015).
45
See Uri Friedman, Airbnb CEO: Cities are Becoming Villages, THE ATLANTIC (Jun 29,
2014, 9:51 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/airbnbceo-cities-are-becoming-villages/373676/.
46
See KOOPMAN, supra note 31, at 15–17.
47
See ANTHONY M. TOWNSEND, SMART CITIES: BIG DATA, CIVIC HACKERS, AND THE
QUEST FOR A NEW UTOPIA 153 (2013). Indeed, in the Internet universe, Tim BernersLee was the ultimate sharing economy founder, as his vision in inventing the Web was
to facilitate particle scientists’ publishing of aggregated data for sharing within that
community. See Christopher Mims, Apps’ Walled Garden Closes Off Wide-Open Web, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 17, 2014 at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/the-web-is-dyingapps-are-killing-it-1416169934.
48
See TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 162.
49
Ecologists call this phenomenon “niche construction”—that people (and even
some other animals) will create new opportunities for themselves by making their
habitats more productive in some way. See Matt Ridley, The World’s Resources Aren’t
Running Out, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579517862612287156.
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The Library Company of Philadelphia.50 Trading goods for services
and goods for other goods, or renting goods or services, supports
sustainability when that concept means limiting exhaustion of nonrenewable resources.51 While residence sharing, like that afforded
through Airbnb, may not be substantially less carbon-intensive than
staying at a hotel, construction of the hotel per se accounts for a
significant fraction of its carbon “footprint.”52
Importance of sustainability benefits aside, the key component of
the sharing economy disrupting entire sectors of the global economy
(such as the hospitality industry) is near zero marginal cost to sharing
producers.53 Marginal cost is the cost of producing an additional unit
of a good or a service once a business establishes its fixed costs.54 While
a hotel chain must build a project to add inventory for consumers,
Airbnb builds almost nothing in addition to occasional tweakings of its
website.55 People merely connect to the Internet and other networks,
as the “Internet of Things”56 expands; they can use big data, analytics,
and algorithms to accelerate efficiency and lower the marginal cost of
producing and sharing a wide range of products and services to near

50

In 1731, Benjamin Franklin convinced members of the Junto, his “society of
mutual improvement,” to pool their resources to purchase a collection of books no
member could have afforded individually. Articles of Agreement were drafted on July
1, 1731, and the Library Company of Philadelphia was established when fifty founding
shareholders signed on. Each founder contributed forty shillings and agreed to pay
ten shillings per year thereafter. As the Library Company’s collection grew, the book
capital of each shareholder expanded as well. Later supported by taxes, until the 1850s
it was the largest public library in America. See generally The History of the Library Company
of Philadelphia, THE LIBRARY COMPANY, http://librarycompany.org/about/history.htm
(last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
51
ALEX STEPHANY, THE BUSINESS OF SHARING: MAKING IT IN THE NEW SHARING
ECONOMY 12, 16, 32–33, 184–85 (2015). See also Anne-Sophie Novel, Is Sharing More
Sustainable? The Environmental Promises of the Sharing Economy, in A PLANET FOR LIFE:
INNOVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 139–44 (Jean-Yves Grosclaude, Rajandra
Pachauri, and Laurence Tubiana eds., 2014).
52
See TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 163.
53
Rifkin, supra note 11.
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
This three-word term (abbreviated sometimes as the “IoT”) refers to collections
of physical objects linked to each other, and to users, through the Internet or other
computer networks. Computers themselves are not usually thought of as belonging to
the IoT, featuring objects like geo-positional tracking devices and home security
systems that until recently were not linked through computer networks. See John A.
Rothchild, Net Gets Physical: What You Need to Know About the Internet of Things, BUS. L.
TODAY (The American Bar Association, Chi, Ill.), Nov. 2014, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2014/11/fullissue-201411.authcheckdam.pdf.

WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE)

124

11/3/2015 2:56 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:111

zero.57 Economic rent-seeking shrinks when institutional gate-keepers
traditionally tracking payments and asset movements in monitoring
transaction completion are not the lone repositories of trust in
commerce.58
City officials know that the sharing economy promotes
community development and repatriates capital into neighborhoods59:
a transaction in the sharing economy promotes neighborhood
economic investment more than a deal engaging a typical
multinational corporation. A Forbes Magazine report estimated that the
sharing economy generated $3.5 billion for its participants.60 The
sharing economy allows people to shorten the chains of commerce and
ultimately to invest repeatedly and directly in their communities.
Notably, sharing systems can be deployed rapidly, leveraging alreadyavailable Web technologies. Cataloging recent business models at
length with collaborative-consumption users would be pointless since,
while preparing this article for publication, myriad models of such
sharing provision will rise and others will crash when no clear value
proposition addressing an authentic need emerges.61 Today’s marketniche dominant models will be surpassed by new models, while others
adjust nimbly to capture new consumer opportunities. For instance,
consider that Uber’s origination featured limousine services, a very
different model than its present operating system.62
Nonetheless, this economy offers cities several advantages in an
entirely new development scheme, beginning with creating mixed-use
57

See Rifkin, supra note 11. The point is that disruption arises from the sharing
economy’s undercutting many established sectors’ already dangerously-low profit
margins.
58
See PAUL VIGNA AND MICHAEL CASEY, THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: HOW BITCOIN
AND DIGITAL MONEY ARE CHALLENGING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 4–5, 8, 62, 244
(2014).
59
See Resolution In Support of Policies for Sharable Cities, THE UNITED STATES
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, 81ST ANN. MEETING (June 21–24, 2013),
www.usmayors.org/resolutions/81st_Conference/metro18.asp.
60
See Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES
(Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-andthe-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)
reported in August 2014, its belief that by 2025 the potential value of the five main
sharing economy “sectors” will be $335 billion. See The Sharing Economy—Sizing the
Revenue Opportunity, PWC,
www.pwc.co.uk//issues/megatrends/collisions/
sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-revenue-opportunity.jhtml
(last
visited Sept. 12, 2015).
61
See Marc-Arthur Gauthey, Why the Majority of Sharing Economy Start Ups Will Fail,
OUI SHARE MAG. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://magazine.ouishare.net/2014/11/why-themajority-of-sharing-economy-start-ups-will-fail/.
62
See Julian Chikkattu & Jordan Crook, A Brief History of Uber, TECH CRUNCH (Aug.
14, 2014), www.techcrunch.com/gallery/a-brief-history-of-uber/.
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enclaves out of strictly residential neighborhoods.63 The economic
advantages include providing desired services to these enclaves’
dwellers as well as consumer services not warranting traditional
market-entrance brick and mortar stores and their higher price
structures.64 Some sharing-economy models substantially impact land
occupancy and burden spatial infrastructure and their dwellers. This
article muses on neighborhood transformations occurring when
unfamiliar persons appear in buildings, rights of way and curbside
parking areas. Readers will think about models featuring home-based
custom retailers, persons with rooms or offices to let,65 food (fresh from
the garden and prepared on the stove) and rides to share, and
equipment and clothing to rent. The sustainability “value proposition”
described in land use terms addresses whether sharing economy
enterprises (and their on-site consumers in combination) afford more
net benefit than nuisance to people jointly occupying the producers’
spatial surroundings.66
III. WHY THE SHARING ECONOMY REQUIRES LAND USE REGULATION
Cities need uniformity in regulations, unless one believes “natural
law”67 sufficiently governs activities springing up in neighborhoods. As
Justice Scalia reminds us, one cannot conform one’s behavior to the
unknowable.68
Accordingly, in residential neighborhoods,
municipalities historically have limited land uses that tend to introduce
unfamiliar persons such as laborers and customers.69 Such regulated
uses in residential areas include home occupations such as watching
children in residences, after school-hours tutoring, musical and arts
training, yard sales, and boarding houses and other congregate living
63

See Miller, supra note 1, at 11.
See id. at 12.
65
See, e.g., LIQUIDSPACE, https://liquidspace.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2015)
(providing workspaces to rent by the hour, day, week, etc.).
66
Cf. NAVI RADJOU & JAIDEEP PRABHU, FRUGAL INNOVATION: HOW TO DO MORE WITH
LESS xiv (2015) (describing the value proposition of doing better in business with fewer
costs, greater sustainability and an enhanced sense of purpose).
67
See John E. Donaldson, Regulation of Conduct in Relation to Land—the Need to Purge
Natural Law Constraints from the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 187, 197,
200 (1974) (discussing the idea that property and liberty are natural rights protected
by higher law undergirds “natural law”; legislation in appropriate instances must
circumscribe natural rights, however, as in exercises of the police power, asserting that
all land is held under a servitude in favor of the states).
68
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–
79 (1989).
69
See, e.g., EMILY TALEN, CITY RULES: HOW REGULATIONS AFFECT URBAN FORM 122
(2012) (noting that rules requiring functional separation are still the norm, so, for the
most part, residentially zoned areas host strictly residential uses).
64
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arrangements.70
Municipalities increasingly experiment with, and occasionally
embrace, regulatory innovation enabling neighborhoods to thrive
harmoniously with entrepreneurs leveraging new forms of
collaborative consumption.71 If cities embracing regulatory change are
more likely to thrive in economic development, job retention, and
affordable housing production, the question is begged whether the
evolving informal economy’s impact on land use demands any
regulation. If the answer is affirmative, here is why. First, a sharing
economy potentially overtaxes parts of the infrastructure without
sharing producers contributing in the way of offsets and mitigation of
burdens.72
Sometimes known as “fiscal freeloading,”73 this
phenomenon applies to developments that increase demand for
public services by a sheer growth in persons introduced into a
community. For instance, owners who aggressively use Airbnb to rent
their homes impose significant impacts on their neighbors, such as
heightened traffic and noise74 generated on local streets.75 Renters of
these properties may occupy curbside stalls otherwise allocable to local
70

See generally, Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the
Home-Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191 (2001); Thomas E. Roberts, The
Regulation of Home Occupations under Zoning Ordinances—Some Constitutional
Consideration, 56 TEMP. L. Q. 49, 49–50 (1983).
71
For example, Los Angeles’ Department of City Planning is experimenting with
industrial mixed-use areas that may support limited residential units through its
Hybrid Industrial Live/Work Zone. See generally Hybrid Industrial Live/Work (HI) Zone
Quick
Guide,
L.A.
DEPT.
CITY
PLANNING
(June
10,
2015),
http://planning.lacity.org/Documents/policy/HIZoneFAQandOrdinance.pdf. This
guide contains a draft of the proposed Sec. 12.04.06 and text amendments to the Los
Angeles Municipal Code. Ironically, Euclidean zoning arose from a perceived need to
separate industrial uses from residences altogether for public health preservation.
72
See, e.g., Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government
Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy 15 (unpublished George
Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 15-01) (available at
http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=83300402402908010909907312212312
70301020560890140950610750970841170740921110860130280280970230290261270
33125076028001016127018042042033065023028064100088021080091020049078082
03100409200808812201807602408100501012006609802912402702500312510107600
3081&EXT=pdf) (asserting that Sharing Enterprises lead to more intensive resource
uses than anticipated by local regulation).
73
See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 45, 49 (1994) (addressing how new developments place a greater burden on
public services than they contribute in new taxes).
74
See Carolyn Said, Airbnb Irks Twin Peaks Neighbors, SFGATE BLOG (Aug. 14, 2014,
7:28
AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/Airbnb-irks-neighbors5687123.php.
75
See, e.g., Eric Biber and J.B. Ruhl, Regulating the “Sharing Economy,” REGBLOG (July
28,
2014),
http://www.regblog.org/2014/07/28/28-biber-ruhl-regulating-thesharing-economy/.
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residents,76 unless the property owner offers sufficient onsite parking
space. Renters use the water and sewer systems; an overabundance of
such renters in one neighborhood could overtax a city block’s service
capacity. Owners not maintaining their rental units may create
problems for public health and sanitation77 if, for example, an owner
fails to dispose of the rental unit’s refuse routinely or neglects to
service the “shared” swimming pool. The owner of property who lacks
funds to make needed repairs may allow the improvements to become
derelict.
Second, while well-planned rental business models may have
vetted suppliers of goods and services, invariably there will be “knockoffs” of successful entrepreneurs in the sharing economy. Although
imitation flatters, underfunded and inexperienced-management
operations may endanger neighborhoods by luring poorly-screened
producers and consumers alike. Rental units may become venues for
drug dealing, stashing and use,78 prostitution79 and other criminal
conduct, or housing persons with infectious health conditions or
chronic economic problems.80
Third, some sharing producers inevitably will “defect” from land
use and related regulations just as they will from any social norm.81
76

See Said, supra note 74. See also Karen Klinger, City Plan to Allow Residential Zipcar
Parking Sparks Controversy, CAMBRIDGE CMTY. TELEVISION (May 21, 2009),
https://www.cctvcambridge.org/node/18076 (discussing objection to zoning change
allowing ZipCar parking in residential areas because users will be “coming and going
at all hours of the day and night” and will reduce available parking spaces for
residents).
77
See Said, supra note 74. Transient dwellers do not properly lid garbage cans,
allowing animals access to the garbage inside.
78
In response to “raves,” parties at which ecstasy is served and partiers dance for
long hours, facilitating dehydration or drug toxicity leading to death, Congress passed
the Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 in October, 42 U.S.C. § 290aa-5b (2012) and
the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012 & Supp. 2004).
Raves are conducted in residential areas in addition to clubs. See, e.g., Kent Page
McGroarty, How to Throw an Awesome Private Rave at Home, SFGATE,
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/throw-awesome-private-rave-home-24945.html (last
visited Sept. 12, 2015).
79
Dana Sauchelli and Bruce Golding, Hookers Turning Airbnb Apartments into
Brothels, N.Y. POST (Apr. 14, 2014, 2:19 AM), http://nypost.com/
2014/04/14/hookers-using-airbnb-to-use-apartments-for-sex-sessions/?utm_source=
Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=NYP%20180%20Day%20Openers%20and
%2030%20Day%20Signups&utm_campaign=NY%2520Post%2520Newsletter.
80
See, e.g., AIRBNB HELL, http://www.airbnbhell.com/tag/airbnb-criminal/ (last
visited Sept. 12, 2015), for anecdotal material.
81
This fact illustrates why digital reputation and monitoring systems for selfpolicing in the sharing economy are critical. See Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan,
Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 116,
128 (2015) [hereinafter Cohen & Sundararajan].
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“Gaming” of a system is human nature and endemic in highly
competitive scenarios82 where an otherwise first-class operation suffers
under low margins. Inevitably, such defection compromises public
safety and the quality of life in the surrounding community. Moreover,
tolerance of flouting established norms like zoning codes, without
enforcement of standards, spurs disregard for the local regulatory
system overall, contributing to a downward spiral of compliance and
blighted conditions.
How do governments accommodate entrepreneurial freedom
and fundamental property rights to the need for baseline community
health and safety standards? Advocates say sharing creates jobs, cuts
greenhouse gasses, reduces traffic (along with wear and tear on roads
and bridges in addition to reducing exhaustion of raw materials used
in vehicular construction), fights crime and even ameliorates the
impact of natural disasters.83 In communities where “ownership” or
possession of goods rapidly changes, cities facilitate citizens sharing
their resources by reducing the volume and complexity of their
regulations. Unregulated collaborative consumption transactions may
endanger public welfare, regardless of consumer “verification,” photos
online, or ratings methods.84 For example, food exchanged via
leftovers-sharing sites may have been prepared inexpertly or under
unsanitary conditions, creating a potential public health hazard
unpreventable by “peer” monitoring mechanisms.85 The typical
consumer does not have the expertise to analyze a food-poisoning
environment. Peer review and self-regulation foster a sense of
community and may be cheaper to implement than centralized
administration. Even so, existing trust and enforcement mechanisms
do not require communities to disregard potential safety incidents,
82

See Nigel Nicholson, How Hardwired is Human Behavior?, HARV. BUS. REV. (July
1998) (noting that humans are hardwired to avoid loss when comfortable, but
scramble desperately when threatened and citing behavior of Nick Leeson, who
destroyed Barings Bank by gaming the trading system).
83
See STEPHANY, supra note 51, at 139–42.
84
See Brenden Mulligan, Dirty Pillows: The Unsolved Problems of Sharing Services,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 1, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/01/dirty-pillows-theunsolved-problems-of-sharing-services/.
85
Typically, in sharing-economy companies, after each transaction both the
consumer and sharing provider are rated. These ratings provide transparency and
accountability and induce sharing parties to provide quality service to protect their
reputations. See, e.g., Rachel Botsman, The Currency of the New Economy is Trust,
TEDGLOBAL 2012 (June 2012), http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_t
he_currency_of_the_new_economy_is_trust?language=en; Tom Slee, Some Obvious
Things about Internet Reputation Systems, WHIMSLEY (Sept. 29, 2013),
http://tomslee.net/2013/09/some-obvious-things-about-internet-reputation-systems
.html. But see infra note 119 and accompanying text.
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epidemics, or other improprieties imposing taxpayer costs resulting
from a lack of express standards and professional enforcement.86
Another problem of unregulated sharing stems from introducing
strangers into communities.87 Although raising this issue invites
overtones of racism or other bias against unfamiliar persons, some who
occupy temporary housing or visit meal-sharing venues investigate
neighborhoods seeking targets for future burglary.88 Distinguishing
transient residents from potential thieves is challenging enough, and
no modestly-organized “block watch” program properly tracks
multiple, subtle canvasses of possible targets for mischief unless the
neighborhood has substantial collective efficiency.89
Even if no malice is intended, “sharing consumers” introduced
into a neighborhood increase traffic movements (some of which, due
to unfamiliarity with the neighborhood’s streets, will create risk of
collisions), fill parking spaces on local streets, generate additional
ambient noise, and further burden electric and other utility grids
proximate to the sharing sites.90 These neighborhood burdens often
are not being addressed in the form of sales taxes or license fees

86

See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 126–27.
See Miller, supra note 1, at 34 (noting that sudden influxes of unfamiliar persons
rapidly changes feeling of familiarity among locals).
88
Sources support the finding that thieves case neighborhoods. See Victor
Urbach, What Burglars Don’t want you to Know, URBACH LETTER (Mar., 2010),
http://www.urbachletter.com/Archive/Safety_1003_BurglaryPrevention.htm;
cf.
JOHN HUGHES, HOME ALONE (1990) (characters Harry Lime and Marv Merchants
canvassing a neighborhood).
89
Neighborhoods with more transient residents and social disorganization tend
to see increases in crime rates due to their weakened social control (where a
community of concerned citizens is missing). See John C. Kilburn, et al., A Paper Tiger
on Chestnut Lane: The Significance of NIMBY Battles in Decaying Communities, 4 URBANITES
3,
7
(2014),
available
at
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/John_
Kilburn2/publication/269408776_A_Paper_Tiger_on_Chestnut_Lane_The_Significa
nce_of_NIMBY_Battles_in_Decaying_Communities/links/548b14720cf225bf669f830
0.pdf. Neighborhood “watch” programs are mostly ineffective in preventing crime;
nor do they result in reduced fear of crime or increased information flow between
citizens and law enforcement. See Jenny Fleming, “Working Together”: Neighborhood
Watch, Reassurance Policing and the Potential of Partnerships, TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE No. 303, 1, 3 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/
media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi303.pdf.
90
See, e.g., Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 122 (noting that an additional
Lyft car on the road creates congestion and lengthens travel times for other drivers,
while a noisy Airbnb guest in an apartment building might impose costs on the other
residents from his or her disturbing behavior); Dean Baker, Don’t Buy the ‘Sharing
Economy’ Hype: Airbnb and Uber are Facilitating Rip-Offs, GUARDIAN TECHNOLOGY (May 27,
2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/27/
airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation (“Airbnb can also raise issues of safety for its customers
and nuisance for hosts’ neighbors.”).
87
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repatriated directly to the host enclaves.91 Further, persons not
participating in the sharing economy expect to maintain their daily
routines without interference from unfamiliar persons, strange noises
and odors, increased traffic and reduced curbside parking.92
Finally, controversy about the economic impact of regulating the
sharing economy shows no signs of waning. Why should the land use
control of the sharing economy be restrained? Does limiting
regulatory restraint encourage entrepreneurism by eliminating costly
overlays on businesses?93 Might entrepreneurism be stifled in an
environment where “anything goes”? Does deregulation encourage
institutional innovation as conventional companies compete for space
in the innovation environment occupied by sharing producers?
Debate over whether or how to regulate the informal economy’s
land use dimensions shall not subside, because this burgeoning
economy will not disappear. Technology will continue “introducing”
sharing consumers and producers to each other, through “freelance”
worker—contingent-employer platforms94 and otherwise.
More
individuals will be engaged over time in this economy because
underemployment of the middle class and all non- or under-skilled
workers is a chronic problem with no immediate solution in sight.95
91

Cf. Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting
of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INEQUALITY 255–57
(Frank Ackerman ed., 2000) (noting undesirable land use siting implicates principles
of environmental justice).
92
Accusations of NIMBY-ism notwithstanding, there is little immoral about a
resident’s wanting to live in a residential area not saturated with transients. See, e.g.,
Tani Sutley, Whatcom County and the New Sharing Economy, NORTHWESTCITIZEN (Dec. 9,
2014, 2:25 AM), http://www.nwcitizen.com/entry/whatcom-county-welcomes-thenew-sharing-economy.
93
Perhaps the test illustration will be Malibu, California, which has allowed shortterm rentals as of right without zoning regulation since 2009, so long as property
owners register with the city and pay the same percentage transient occupancy tax that
hotels remit. See Matt Stevens & Martha Groves, Malibu to Crack Down on Short-Term
Rentals via Airbnb, Other Websites, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2014, 8:09 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-malibu-renting-20140528-story.html#page=1.
94
See Lauren Weber & Rachel Emma Silverman, On-Demand Workers: We are not
Robots, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2015, at B1, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/ondemand-workers-we-are-not-robots-1422406524. The authors note that companies
using this form of worker engagement now tout their workers as “micro-entrepreneurs
of the vanguard of a new, flexible future of work in which people only do the jobs they
like.” Id. Essentially, these are options with no possibility of advancement and no
benefits. Contingent arrangements permit business cost-savings by avoiding healthcare insurance premiums and retirement-system administrative expenses.
95
Full-time employment opportunities particularly are elusive in America’s
current economic and employer-mandated health-care circumstances, due to higher
costs of retaining full-time workers. See Nick Timiraos, Many Face New Normal: Part-Time
Pay, Full-Time Bills, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2014, at A1 (video available at
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Indeed, some pundits blame technological developments for creating
this problem.96 The class of youthful adherents to sustainability
principles is growing.97 The number of persons with little or no savings
is staggering,98 compelling many to address how to “cut corners” on
everyday expenses. Additionally, evidence mounts that forthcoming
generations of entrepreneurs are decreasing in numbers,99 suggesting
that new business models in the knowledge economy will not place
most of the underemployed and unemployed in full-time, subsistencewage positions, particularly in circumstances where workers lack
crucial technical job skills.100 Finally, from rebellion, desire for
schedule flexibility, or other reasons, some adults will not rejoin the
conventional workforce whether or not jobs numbers grow.101
http://www.wsj.com/video/is-high-part-time-employment-the-new-normal/57FA23
DD-E5C3-4B03-B707-1448598161F5.html?KEYWORDS=timiraos+part+time). Given
the American economy’s recovery circumstances, while full time jobs have been added
in 2014, the total number is short of jobs numbers during 2007, when America’s
recession commenced. See id. at A2. Timiraos speculates that part-time employment
will replace full-time work, but cannot prove this theory given currently decreasing
part-time U.S. jobs numbers. See id.
96
William A. Galston, Countering Tech’s Damaging Effect on Jobs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15,
2014, at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/william-galston-counteringtechs-damaging-effect-on-jobs-1413328435 (discussing how many jobs will be
automated away over the next twenty years). Gartner reports that robots and other
automated devices will perform one-third of all jobs within a decade. See Timothy
Aeppel, What Clever Robots Mean for Jobs, WALL ST. J. TECH (Feb. 24, 2015, 10:30 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-clever-robots-mean-for-jobs-1424835002.
97
See JEREMY L. CARADONNA, SUSTAINABILITY: A HISTORY 2, 205–06 (2014).
98
See, e.g., Rani Molla, Americans Have a Hard Time Covering Emergency Expenses,
WALL ST. J. THE NUMBERS BLOG (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:09 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/numbers/americans-have-a-hard-time-covering-emergencyexpenses-1698/ (noting that Americans have little savings, and perhaps twenty-five
percent of Americans have none at all, making emergency expenses difficult to cover);
see also Ann Carrns, Why it’s Hard to Build Emergency Savings, N.Y. TIMES BUCKS BLOG
(June 25, 2013, 1:08 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/why-its-hardto-build-emergency-savings/?_r=0 (noting that half of Americans have less than three
months of expenses saved up, and just a quarter have six months of expenses saved,
which is the typical recommendation for emergency financial reserves, according to
Bankrate.com’s report based on a 2013 survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates
International).
99
See Mitchell E. Daniels, How Student Debt Harms the Economy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28,
2015, at A15, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/mitchell-e-daniels-how-studentdebt-harms-the-economy-1422401693 (discussing that the percentage of younger
people reporting owning part of a new business has decreased as has the percentage
of business begun by Americans under thirty-four years of age; and former-student
debt magnitude seems to correlate to new venture formation).
100
See Mark Trumbull, Unemployment, Inc.: Six reasons why America can’t create jobs,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/
2011/0902/Unemployment-Inc.-Six-reasons-why-America-can-t-create-jobs.
101
See Kate Taylor, Why Millennials are ending the 9 to 5, FORBES WOMAN (Aug. 23,
2013,
2:00
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/katetaylor/2013/08/23/why-
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In truth, no thoughtful person should want, outright, to stifle this
phenomenon. Among other reasons, consider that:
1. Working at/from the home saves on office-based utilities
consumed inside suites and in building common areas and on
worker business overhead costs, so it is a sustainable business
practice;
2. Having neighborhood proximity of consumers and producers
builds familiarity with the neighborhood and strengthens
immediate community ties, with the side effect of
discouraging petty crime (the so-called “regulating functions”
of sidewalk-level life102);
3. This on-demand economy, bolstered by social media
platforms, spurs entrepreneurism among workers in the
knowledge economy and enables some financial support
means for a shrinking class of workers;
4. Creating jobs, even if in small numbers, in the present chronic
condition of unemployment and underemployment among
the unskilled work force could result in a “virtuous cycle” of
additional
training
and
employment
placement
103
opportunities;
5. Enabling a permanent class of small business owners/
partners, whether or not serial entrepreneurs (those building
companies with intention of selling and cashing in), can
produce diversity of business models for a protracted period,
affording additional income to those engaged in the
millennials-are-ending-the-9-to-5/. A compelling social dimension of the sharing
economy is experience consumption, opposed to goods acquisition, leading to
heightened contentment in some younger persons preferring to spend disposable
income on life experiences, economizing through borrowing instead of owing
possessions. See Joel Stein, Baby You Can Drive My Car and Stay in My Guest Room. And
do my Errands. And Rent My Stuff. My Wild Ride through the New On-Demand Economy,
TIME, Feb. 9, 2015, at 32, available at http://time.com/3687305/testing-the-sharingeconomy/. This partially explains why persons who do not need sharing platforms use
them nonetheless. See id. at 40.
102
JACOBS, supra note 26, at 60–88.
103
Following the recession of the later years of the 21st Century’s initial decade,
the challenge of replacing living-wage jobs is amplified by the rise of automation as a
proxy for human workplace labor. See Derek Thompson, A World Without Work, THE
ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/07/world-withoutwork/395294/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). Some economists and other observers
contend the sharing economy is not built to create long-term, stable jobs but instead
is fostering downward mobility among Millennials. See, e.g., Reid Cramer, How the
Sharing
Economy
is
Hurting
Millennials,
TIME
(June
29,
2015),
http://time.com/3939850/sharing-economy-pitfalls/; Monica Potts, The PostOwnership Society, WASH. MONTHLY (June 2015), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/
magazine/junejulyaugust_2015/features/the_postownership_society055896.php.
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“conventional” workplace; and
6. Reducing the personal habit of overconsumption, which
heavily burdens certain non-renewable resources and
contributes to mounting personal debt,104 is a positive
behavioral modification.
Wealthy and underemployed micro-giggers alike will conduct small
businesses in their (or their parents’) homes, undetectably in many
cases, unless they produce noxious by-products of their businesses or
they self-identify to authorities as occupying workplaces. A reactionary
community policy will not arrest this growing social norm. Part IV
considers those instrumentalities of regulation ideally positioned and
otherwise well suited to regulate this sector of social and economic life
in America.
IV. HARNESSING SHARING ECONOMY LAND USE REGULATION: PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE INPUTS
This Part addresses two themes: who possesses needed inputs and
wisdom to regulate the collaborative consumption environment within
conventional residential enclaves and whether Sharing Enterprises can
be regulated without upending the ownership expectations of
residents and the social equity underpinnings of sharing.
A. Public Regulation of Sharing Economy Land Use Dimensions.
Local American governments have experience in regulating land
use and efficiency going back a century. Together with public faith in
accountability of local government structures, this background favors
continued local government—or perhaps regional government—
control of new sharing economy business models and initiatives. Here
are the arguments supporting this view. A precast system of reasonably
stable105 and precise laws and regulations discourages favoritism or
exercising individual bureaucratic venality.106 When regulations are
104

See Claire Cain Miller, Is Owning Overrated? The Rental Economy Rises, N.Y. TIMES
THE UPSHOT BLOG (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/upshot/isowning-overrated-the-rental-economy-rises.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1.
105
See Jonathan Rothwell & Douglas S. Massey, The Effect of Density Zoning on Racial
Segregation in U.S. Urban Areas, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 779, 789 (2009) (providing that many
local jurisdictions report that zoning regulations do not change much over time).
106
Some critics assert that macro-level zoning regulations sustain segregation (a
type of “favoritism”) in communities with low-density residential zoning. See generally
Rothwell & Massey, supra note 105. See also Charles Lord & Keaton Norquist, Cities as
Emergent Systems: Race as a Rule in Organized Complexity, 40 ENVTL. L. 551, 584–99 (2010).
Such critics also argue that zoning adjustment is rife with authorities succumbing to
their own desires and fears as well as emotional responses of others who exert the most
influence upon them. See Stewart M. Wiener, Comment, Substantive Due Process in the
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sufficiently explicit, they may be uniformly applied without fear of
contamination by individual discretion;107 this predictability comforts
many citizens. Additionally, the economic rationale for zoning
adopted and enforced by public bodies states that land use creates
positive and negative local externalities.108 Thus, while if a resident
plants flowers in her front yard, her whole city block benefits; but filled
with inoperable vehicles awaiting repairs, the resident’s yard spoils her
neighbors’ streetscape and property values. A low-tech factory sited
next to a suburb usually presents an eyesore.109 While a popular cafe
may enliven a neighborhood, its patrons compete with adjacent
residents for scarce curbside parking. Faced with such local
externalities, principles of “market efficiency” cease to apply, as
publicly administered zoning laws balance social welfare issues.
Zoning rules seek to mitigate citizen-entrepreneur activities with
negative externalities while encouraging activities with positive
impacts.110 For instance, San Francisco’s response to Airbnb-generated
problems is legislation (a) allowing only permanent city residents to
rent out rooms or entire homes, provided citizens enroll in a city
registry and purchase liability insurance, (b) limiting rentals of full
residences to ninety days annually and (c) providing for its Planning
Department to enforce the new regulation.111
Twilight Zone: Protecting Property Interests from Arbitrary Land Use Decisions, 69 TEMP. L.
REV. 1467, 1467 (1996).
107
Cf. Rob Imrie & Emma Street, Regulating Design: The Practices of Architecture,
Governance and Control, 46 URB. STUDIES 2507, 2507 (2009) (noting that building
regulations, codes and rules are formulated to provide specific and predictable
outcomes for all aspects of architectural production).
108
See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive
Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 214, 220 (2012).
109
See Nathan Smith, Zoned Out: Why and How We Should Seek to Restore a Free Market
in Land, THE FREEMAN (Mar. 18, 2014), http://fee.org/freeman/detail/zoned-out.
An exception arises when the factory is adaptively reused for another purpose serving
the residential population. See, e.g., Michael N. Widener, Tactical Urbanism v2: Dynamic
Land Use Regulation and Partnership Tools Regenerating First Suburbs, 8 DREXEL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Widener, Tactical Urbanism]. See also Michael N.
Widener, Renewed Energy: Sustainable Historic Assets as Keystones in Urban Center
Revitalization, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 723, 744–47 (2015).
110
See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 108, at 225.
111
See San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 218-14 (Oct. 17, 2014), available at
https://sfgov.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=3292337&GUID=67C37394-6A6349DC-A886-675E294384C1 [hereinafter SF Ord.]. Highlights of the legislation
include:
 All city residential buildings of two or more units are subject to this rental
regulation;
 Residents who are not registered with the city but are found renting short-term
after a complaint is filed are automatically in violation of the legislation;
 Registered residents must demonstrate compliance in the event of a complaint;
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The standard counterargument to employing precast systems
imposed across diffused environments of entrepreneurism, is that
central planning inflexibly values compliance over outcomes.112
Opponents of centralized planning may cite the City of Winona’s
rental-housing unit “percentage per block” ordinance as an illustration
of this inflexibility.113 Adopted December 5, 2005 by Winona’s City
Council114 and affirmed by a task force appointed by it in 2010,115 the
ordinance limits rental housing units in a given city block to thirty

and
 Residents that violate the law (i.e., cannot demonstrate compliance) are
“blacklisted” from listing their unit on all platforms until they achieve
compliance.
Among stakeholder reactions was a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief filed by
HomeAway, Inc., which claims the permanent resident restriction accommodates
Airbnb’s business model but not their clients’ business models, many of whom do not
live in the city. See HomeAway Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. 3:14-cv-04859-JCS
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015). The suit also alleged the new ordinance violates the
Constitution’s interstate commerce clause by requiring companies providing “Hosting
Platforms,” defined as ”a person or entity through which an Owner [or lessee] may
offer a Residential Unit” for short-term use, to conform to a single business model or
face legal penalties. See SF Ord., at 11. In short, the plaintiff concludes that the
ordinance evidences the Supervisors’ desire “to favor a local business at the expense
of out of state competitors,” instead of creating policies fairly treating residence owners
regardless of their domiciles. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief for
Constitutional Violations at ¶ 64, HomeAway, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. 14-cv04859-JCS (N.D. Cal. Jan 27, 2015), 2014 WL 5510760. The United States District for
the Northern District of California on January 27, 2015, granted the Defendants’
motion to dismiss on several grounds, including lack of standing (Plaintiff owned no
homes in the City). See HomeAway, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. 14-cv-04859-JCS,
2015 WL 367121 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015).
112
See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE RULE OF NOBODY: SAVING AMERICA FROM DEAD LAWS
AND BROKEN GOVERNMENT 38 (2014).
113
The zoning law’s “Thirty Percent Rule” was aimed at diffusing private-sector
student housing, which tends to be concentrated near the campuses of Winona State
University and Saint Mary’s University in Winona. See John Croman, Winona Faces
Lawsuit over Rental Property Cap, KARE 11 BLOG (Oct. 26, 2011, 8:11 PM),
http://www.kare11.com/news/article/944026/14/Winona-faces-lawsuit-over-rentalproperty-cap. Winona is intemperate, climatologically speaking, during much of the
conventional August through May school year. See Winona, MN, Period of Record Monthly
Climate Summary, WESTERN REGIONAL CLIMATE CENTER, http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/cgibin/cliMAIN.pl?mn9067 (last visited Sept. 6, 2015). One reasonably assumes walking
and biking to classes are challenging, inducing motor vehicle usage that is less
sustainable (more carbon monoxide and particulate emissions and increased demand
for parking lots) than a shorter walk or bike ride from more densely rental housing
areas affords. This ordinance likely is incompatible with the stated mission of Sustain
Winona, a collaboration of the city, Winona County and the area public schools and
local universities. See SUSTAIN WINONA, http://www.sustainwinona.org/index.html
(last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
114
See WINONA, MINN. CITY CODE ch. 33A, §33A.03(i) (2013).
115
Dean v. City of Winona, 843 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014).
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percent of the total dwelling units.116 There is no apparent reason why
the “Thirty Percent Rule” identified the optimal percentage, although
apparently it achieved some intended “dispersal of rental patterns”
effect.117
The argument against command-and-control style regulation
further proceeds that centralized planning stifles innovation in
producing goods and services by slowing the rate of innovation.
Outright public bans on Sharing Enterprises are the worst offense in
this regard, and banning or de minimis variations on bans will not
engender compliance.118 Instead, many sharing producers will react to
regulatory banishment by going farther underground, risking
detection at a later time.119 This is because the very illegality of the
sharing producer’s operation—by avoiding costs of regulatory
compliance—often affords her a competitive advantage over the
established market players in an entrepreneurial space.120 Yet as one
result of ineffective or piecemeal regulation enforcement weakening
the community is the citizens’ diminished trust in the rule of law,121 this
anti-centralized regulation argument must be bolstered by advocacy
for peer self-regulation.122 Furthermore, centrally planned regimes
become rigid and increasingly distanced from “market-pricing” signals
about efficient use of resources.123
Market flexibility and
116

In 2011, owners of houses in Winona challenged the rule in Minnesota state
court, alleging the “Thirty Percent Rule” as an ultra vires act exceeding the city’s
zoning powers under the state’s Zoning Enabling Act. See MINN. STAT. § 462.357
(2012), and violating their rights to equal protection, substantive due process and
procedural due process secured by the Minnesota Constitution (Article I, Sections 2
or 7) and asking for injunctive and declaratory relief. The decision of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals affirming the city’s right to pass the ordinance on appeal to the
Minnesota Supreme Court, was dismissed as moot; the high court found that
appellants no longer had an interest in the appeal’s outcome and “the case does not
present the urgency and impact that were present in other cases that we have found
functionally justiciable and of statewide significance” justifying an exception to the
doctrine of mootness. See Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015).
117
See Dean, 843 N.W.2d at 254. Mankato (MN) City Attorney Eileen Wells wrote
in an amicus brief to Minnesota’s Supreme Court: “Now and into the uncertain future,
Minnesota cities need to be able to use all of the ‘tools’ within their authority,
including the ability to limit the number of rental units, to fulfill their obligations to
their citizens.” Id.
118
Miller, supra note 1, at 20.
119
See id. at 37. Miller correctly notes that the likelihood of monitoring all Internet
sites marketing peer-to-peer sharing involving neighborhoods is highly remote.
120
See id. at 16.
121
See id. at 25, 37.
122
See, e.g., Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81 at 116 (arguing that resolving
challenges of peer-to-peer regulatory challenges must include self-regulatory
approaches).
123
See Smith, supra note 109.
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complementarily flexible public policies are critical in a time when
technology will reorganize cities.124
Another fundamental shortcoming in zoning laws is that they
operate at a higher-grained level than the individual level, ineffectively
controlling the myriad of particular shared circumstances in cities and
rural areas across our nation.125 Central planning is too removed from
the local environment to address nuanced circumstances. Naturally,
the knowledge of people in the neighborhood is one foundation of a
community’s successful planning.126 Their inputs are lost, however,
when town planners believe themselves more knowledgeable than
their citizens, so these “experts” listen less as a result. With the
increasing complexity of cities as systems, they become less predictable
and therefore less subject to good decision-making about resource
allocation, management and related planning decisions.127 Indeed,
when coordination of mass mobile and fixed technological devices
reports individual actions and movements in real time, the need to
“plan” anything diminishes.128 As the use of technology distinguishes
minute variations in conditions between locations, centralizing plans
and policies will increasingly be irrelevant.129 In the sharing economy,
this translates to sophisticated controls imbedded in peer-to-peer
marketplaces, such as digital “reputation systems” featuring detailed
post-transaction ratings and identity-verification systems.130 There may
be reason, however, to doubt the trustworthiness of the parties
124

See Peter M. Townroe, Urban Sustainability and Social Cohesion, in SUSTAINABILITY
ENVIRONMENT AND URBANISATION 181–85 (Cedric Pugh ed., 1996); Balaji
Srinivasan, Software Is Reorganizing the World, WIRED BLOG (Nov. 22, 2013, 9:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2013/11/software-is-reorganizing-the-world-and-cloudformations-could-lead-to-physical-nations/.
125
Anthony M. Townsend, Life in the Real Time City: Mobile Telephones and Urban
Metabolism, 7 J. URB. TECH. 85, 89 (2000).
126
See, e.g., K. Al-Kodmany, Using visualization techniques for enhancing public
participation in planning and design: process, implementation, and evaluation, 45 LANDSCAPE
& URB. PLAN. 37, 38 (1999) (noting that access to community expertise and local
knowledge produces better plans and designs).
127
Townsend, supra note 125, at 89, 98–99 (arguing that diffusion of the
decentralized networks of individuals renders urban theory (relying on “centralized
thinking”) ineffective to explain how cities function and ought to grow and, therefore,
a new era is coming in which the individual ought to be the unit of planning analysis).
128
Id. at 96.
129
Id. at 101–02.
130
See, e.g., Arun Sundararajan, Trusting the ‘Sharing Economy’ to Regulate Itself, N.Y.
TIMES
ECONOMIX
BLOG
(Mar.
3,
2014,
12:01
AM),
http://
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/trusting-the-sharing-economy-to-regulateitself/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (explaining that protocols verifying identity and
screening suppliers lowers market failure risks by making suppliers and consumers feel
safer, rendering government oversight less crucial).
THE
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establishing platforms for citizen inputs.131 A 2014 study finds
widespread discriminatory pricing on several popular e-commerce
sites, revealing steering of consumers to sub-optimal “deals” and
charging different sums for the same goods or services.132
Changes in identifying and analyzing those finer-grained details
and manipulating technologies of data gathering in the realm of socalled “Big Data”133 weigh in favor of continued municipal control of
planning in a new milieu. Researchers gather data at street level to
quantify urban life, save money and improve the quality of lives in their
cities.134 Tracking both cell phone activity of private citizens and
readings from sensor packs mounted (among other places) on street
lamps, city agencies can monitor dozens of activities and conditions,
including hours when citizens turn on and off light fixtures in their
residences, vehicular traffic counts, sound volume, wind speeds,
pedestrian flows along sidewalks, and carbon-dioxide and other
pollutants levels.135 In the near term, public data collection will come
from “remote sensing” and “social sensing.”136 The former relies upon
remotely-sensed data collected from a variety of devices such as radar,
radiometer and LiDAR,137 collectively tracking the physical features of
the surface of the landscape explored.138 In 2014, more than eleven
billion sensors were attached to natural resources, production lines,

131

And trust levels are paramount even in self-regulating, as Elinor Ostrum noted:
governing complex systems depends on good, trustworthy information processes
including information pertaining to uncertainty and its magnitude. See Elinor Ostrum
et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, 284 SCIENCE 278, 279
(1999).
132
See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Why You Can’t Trust You’re Getting the Best Deal Online,
WALL ST. J. TECH BLOG, (Oct. 23, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/
articles/why-you-cant-trust-youre-getting-the-best-deal-online-1414036862?mod=
trending_now_4. Several of these e-commerce sites investigated were leisure and
hospitality industry-related, the same sector occupied by Airbnb. See id.
133
TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 17–18, 29.
134
Elizabeth Dwoskin, They’re Tracking When You Turn Off the Lights, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 21, 2014, at B1–2, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/theyre-trackingwhen-you-turn-off-the-lights-1413854422.
135
See id.
136
See Yu Liu, et al., Social Sensing: A new Approach to Understanding Our Socio-Economic
Environments, 105 ANN. ASSOC. AM. GEOG. 512, 513, 515–16 (2015), available at
http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~sgao/papers/2015_AnnalsAAG_SocialSensing.pdf.
137
LIDAR is a remote sensing technology measuring distances by illuminating a
target with a laser and analyzing the reflected light; it is frequently employed to make
high-resolution maps, including 3D elevation maps of terrain, but has multiple
applications in transportation as well as geospatial reckoning. See MICHAEL J. OLSEN,
GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF MOBILE LIDAR IN TRANSPORTATION APPLICATIONS 1–3, 50–
53 (2013).
138
See id.
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electricity grids, logistics networks and recycling flows, as well as in
homes, offices, stores and vehicles, feeding Big Data into the “Internet
of Things.”139 By 2020, experts project that at least fifty billion sensors
will connect to that Internet.140
Social sensing involves spatially and temporally tagged data
collected from location-aware devices such as mobile phones and GPS
systems continuously operated and monitored by citizens. Social
sensing devices detect social and economic features of the landscape,
with the individual using her device in the role of “sensor.”141 In social
sensing, there is greater temporal variation of activities than more
static operations of remote sensing devices.142 Fusing such multi-source
data, geospatial activities are analyzable through conventional image
processing methods, leading to a vastly more complete picture of
geographical environments.143
While issues like municipal invasion of privacy from such
surveillance and the lack of transparency of data gathered for analysis
are consequential,144 it seems less true today that local knowledge of
people on the ground is both foundational and unknowable to
community agencies. More interesting than debating who ought to
harness land use policy is determining how data mined by “disruptive”
technologies impacts centralized land use planning and the roles of
the everyday citizen in analyzing, collecting, and manipulating streams
of data and planning and executing suitable actions in the public
interest. Commuter-parking mapping provides a common-sense
illustration of the power of harnessed data streams. SmoothParking
Inc. supplies a smartphone application guiding users to curbside
parking zones indicating where it is—and shortly will become—legal
to park, aiding both commuters and residents who will otherwise
relocate their vehicles to avoid ticketing.145 Cities, the private sector
and consumers all want the same thing from such parking data: ease
of access. Greater accessibility minimizes frustration levels, which
139

See Rifkin, supra note 11.
See Dave Evans, The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet is
Changing Everything, CISCO INTERNET BUSINESS SOLUTIONS GROUP 1, 3 (Apr. 2011),
https://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf.
141
See Rifkin, supra note 11.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
See Dwoskin, supra note 134, at B2. Privacy issues from this surveillance are not
subjects of this Article.
145
Javier Espinoza, Parking Spaces are a Perfect Niche, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/entrepreneur-finds-profitable-niche-parking-spaces1414965251. Recently, the application now allows commuters to identify available
parking garages as well.
140
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prompts less rational risk-taking, conflicting traffic movements and
collisions or “road rage” events.
Location (proximity of one land use or a single operation in its
spatial context) will be merged with known consequences of thousands
of minute transactions (such as social contacts) among citizens. This
more accurately measures “capacity” and “saturation” impacts on
surroundings arising from specific land use project proposals.146
Greater predictability of needed outcome mitigation in development
project execution from real-time reporting and studying of street-level
transactions in neighborhoods awaits the public. Analyzing this data
with public inputs pertaining to neighborhood cultural values, history,
and context will be more useful than planner’s training-based
assumptions or planning models based on historical data (such as
parking demand or traffic trips’ generation) about a project’s
expected consequences.147
B. Private Regulation of Sharing Economy Land Use Dimensions
“[Jane Jacobs’] critique of top-down planning was entirely
consistent with the evolutionary biologist’s understanding of cities.”148
“[T]he planning elite ‘completely failed to understand and respect the
far more complex order that healthy cities already embodied. This
complex order . . . was the result not of big plans but of all the little
plans of ordinary people that alone can generate the diversity that is
the true glory of a great city.’”149 “[U]rban design is as much art as it is
science.
It has to respond to countless local variables and
idiosyncrasies.”150
Jacobsian micro-planning by ordinary citizens begins with a
generalized view that cities are messy places, not centrally ordered but
146

An example is in local government siting of public facilities (playgrounds,
senior centers, etc.) inducing social interaction of various segments of a community’s
population; the intention is to optimize the location’s support of individual well-being
and neighborhood livability. See, e.g., Rejuvenating Neighborhoods and Communities
Through Parks—A Guide to Success, NATIONAL RECREATION AND PARK ASSOCIATION 8, 27
(2011),
http://www.nrpa.org/uploadedFiles/nrpa.org/Publications_and_Research/Researc
h/Papers/Rejuvenating-Neighborhoods-White-Paper.pdf.
147
See Al-Kodmany,, supra note 126, at 4041, 45.
148
TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 98.
149
Id. (quoting Robert Fishman, The Death and Life of Regional Planning, in
REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM 114 (Bruce Katz ed., 2000)). Jacobs’ comments on
diversity’s contribution to complex order are contained in JACOBS, supra note 26, at 14,
394–95, 402–03. See also id. at 84 (“Working places and commerce must be mingled
right in with residences . . . .”).
150
TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 231.
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evolving mainly from the bottom upwards, and products of millions of
individual and small group decisions and transactions, occasionally
counter-balanced by top-down, centralized action.151 The primary
argument against exclusively private regulation of land use dimensions
of the sharing economy is: consumer trust, incorporating the wisdom
of crowds expressed through crowd-sourcing behavior in marketing
(by social media exposure), thereby endorsing or repudiating new
business models through ratings sites,152 however productive, does not
alone curb “defection” from social norms required to maintain a
community’s public health and safety.153 Human nature demonstrates,
when individuals share common resources or work together seemingly
for mutual benefit, that some (called “free-riders” or “opportunists”)
seek to reap benefits without paying their associated costs, mandating
mechanisms to build substantial cooperation among potential
defectors over time.154 In theory, the sharing economy provides its own
alternative to traditional legal protections via reputation and ranking
systems.155 If consumers are constantly able to review the performance
of producers, norm-defecting actors inevitably will “pay” under a
151

See Townsend, supra note 125, at 86 (quoting MICHAEL BATTY, THE NEW SCIENCE
CITIES 14–15 (2013)) (identifying cities as more “biological organisms” than
“mechanical machines” featuring some grand design and restoring equilibrium
through periodic negative feedbacks such as regulation schemes).
152
Rating sites reliability soon may be replaced by a trust “marketplace,” in which
consumers rely on personal networks and ratings of “raters” for vetting of vendors. cf.
NICK BILTON, I LIVE IN THE FUTURE & HERE’S HOW IT WORKS, 112–13 (2010). Bloggers
already have made significant inroads in the “trust market” compared to prosumer
sites like Yelp, which is a company under frequent attack for questionable ethical
conduct that cannot seem to deflect credibly the accusations. See, e.g., How One
Restaurant Fought Yelp’s Alleged Extortion, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 13, 2014),
http://nypost.com/2014/10/13/restaurant-fights-yelps-alleged-extortion/;
Eric
Goldman, Court Says Yelp Doesn’t Extort Businesses, FORBES TECH BLOG (Sept. 3, 2014,
12:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/09/03/court-says-yelpdoesnt-extort-businesses/. See also BILTON, supra note 152, at 111–12.
153
See Tarun Wadhwa, Who’s Looking Out for Consumers in the Sharing Economy?, HUFF
POST TECH BLOG (May 5, 2014, 5:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tarunwadhwa/whos-looking-out-for-cons_b_5269138.html.
154
Sarah Schoenmakers, Christian Hilbe, Bernd Blasius & Arne Traulsen, Sanctions
as Honest Signals—The Evolution of Pool Punishment by Public Sanctioning Institutions, 356
J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 36, 36–37 (Sept. 2014), available at http://ac.elscdn.com/S0022519314002392/1-s2.0-S0022519314002392-main.pdf?_tid=b9471a585b27-11e5-b9cf00000aab0f6b&acdnat=1442266367_3cab50d7b54ccc134f50d92ad0ff3e6a.
See also
Christian Hilbe, Arne Taurlsen, Torsten Rohl & Manfred Milinski, Democratic Decisions
Establish Stable Authorities That Overcome the Paradox of Second-Order Punishment, 111 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 752 (2014) available at http://web.evolbio.mpg.de/~hilbe/
Research_files/Hilbe%20et%20al%20(PNAS%202014)%20Decocratic%20decisions.
pdf.
155
See Wadhwa, supra note 153.
OF
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hailstorm of public criticism. In practice, however, these group
customer feedback systems can be opaque, guilty of varying credibility
and uneven “enforcement.”156 If there is no sense of shame within
“cheaters” among sharing providers, there are few barriers to flouting
“trust norms” occasionally or serially.157
Unfortunately, peer
punishment—where victims or third parties punish cheaters in the
same circumstances as the defector—can be viewed as a type of selfjustice, subject to its own catalog of abuses like antisocial punishment
and retaliation.158
Conversely, “pool punishment,” featuring highly-visible
sanctioning institutions, serves as a costly signal, inducing most
defectors to cooperate over time.159 Such institutions are especially
relevant in relatively “anonymous” communities; sharing producers,
for one group, are too large to be aware of everyone’s reputation. In
such cases, mere notice of a central “sanctioning” body’s existence
improves cooperation.160
So, if private actors will implement
punishment mechanisms and institutions, those non-public official
stakeholders in the sharing economy must endorse appropriate
cooperation levels within each business “type.” Such is a daunting task
when many stakeholders’ own business models are so recent, and their
lack of operating experience hampers private parties’ crafting
regulations and behavior standards applicable to a continuously
evolving spectrum of business conduct.161 The novelty of a steady moral
156

See id.
See generally, June P. Tangney, Jeffrey Stuewig and Andres G. Martinez, Two Faces
of Shame: The Roles of Shame and Guilt in Predicting Recidivism, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 799–805
(Mar. 2014). Perhaps the bigger problem in flouting norms is actors perceiving a small
deviation from standards to be immaterial, ignoring the cumulative effect of myriad
small violations—creation of sizable negative externalities in the community, cf. Miller,
supra note 1, at 20.
158
See Schoenmakers et al., supra note 154, at 37.
159
See id. at 40, 44.
160
See id. at 44. Conversely, these authors note, opportunists start cheating when
it is apparent that there is no central punishment authority. Id. Such institutions are
especially effective when they require a mix of different mechanisms such as secondorder punishment to induce fair outcomes and reliance on the signaling effect to
reduce free-riding. Id. When individuals have to accept the decision of the majority,
they prefer a society with second-order punishment. See Hilbe et al., supra note 154, at
752, 755.
161
Cf. Alfredo Mendez, Startup Ethics: Is the New Sharing Economy Unfair for Workers?,
MARCULA
CTR
FOR
APPLIED
ETHICS
BLOG
(Aug.
27,
2014),
http://www.scu.edu/r/ethics-center/ethicsblog/business-ethics-news/20343/
STARTUP-ETHICS:-Is-the-New-Sharing-Economy-Unfair-for-Workers?; Wadhwa, supra
note 153 (“For an industry that claims to be built on trust, the companies that make
up the sharing economy have adeptly avoided addressing these [trust] issues directly.
When regulators have tried to bring up legitimate questions about safety and standards
157
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compass, one built typically (but not exclusively) by years of experience
in independent living—an experience not native to youthful sharing
producers and prosumers only adds to this challenge.162
1. Grass Roots Citizens’ Regulation
General plans, the “visionary” document guiding a city’s planning
intentions,163 result from thousands of conversations; these lead to
decisions about proper balancing of a community’s set of virtues.164 In
organically slow-growing cities, these decisions are made incrementally
on a small scale, responding to local needs and larger trends.165
Economies of scale and advancing “smart city” technologies, however,
will usher in progressively more technocratic and frenetically paced
real estate development. In this era, decisions by the administrative
state might become less well-informed and increasingly ad hoc.166
To return to a more grass roots, “bottom-up” participatory
approach to community master planning, officials ought to consider
whether new agencies—such as micro-village governance structures,
neighborhood citizen land use panels, and community benefits
agreement managers—offer better monitoring and enforcement of
zoning rules at the “granular” level of the neighborhood.167 The
these companies have been quick to paint themselves as innovators under attack by
special interests. In some cases this is true, in others it’s just a distraction from
[addressing] a reasonable complaint.”). See also infra Part VI (discussing challenges in
private regulation of Sharing Enterprises).
162
See Lauren Hudson, Who’s Responsible for the “Moral Compass” of the New Economy?,
GRASSROOTS ECONOMIC ORGANIZING, http://www.geo.coop/story/whos-responsiblemoral-compass-new-economy (last visited Sept. 12, 2015); Natasha Singer, In the
Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and Uncertainty, N.Y TIMES TECH. (Aug. 16,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economyworkers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.html?_r=1 (discussing that micro-workers
have little recourse against peer marketplace “hiring” firms when the companies for
which they work on-call change their business models or pay rates or when consumers
cancel reservations or service requests).
163
Michael N. Widener, Moderating Citizen “Visioning” in Town Comprehensive
Planning: Deliberative Dialog Processes, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 29, 31–32 (2013).
164
TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 112.
165
See id.
166
See id.
167
Skeptics of such granularity should be reminded that in some Western nations,
small scale local planning is mandated. In Germany, for instance, detailed
development plans known as Bebauungsplan, provide developers following “zoning
map and text” rules with the same legal certainty existing in most American
communities; these plans dominate local land use administration and at times
represent areas as small as a single city block. See Sonia Hirt, Mixed Use by Default: How
the Europeans (Don’t) Zone, 27 J. PLANNING LITERATURE 375, 385–87 (2012). In Sweden,
detaljplaner—detailed development plans outlining rules related to land use, bulk and
density—may cover but one city block; Stockholm has more than 1,000 such plans. Id.
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following subsections consider the use of existing (and at times
entrenched) citizen-based organizations to engage in small-scale land
use regulation. These bodies may be loosely referred to as “legal
neighborhoods,” associations wielding certain quasi-political and legal
tools to maintain order and exercise stewardship within their
respective jurisdictions.168 The reader must understand preliminarily
that municipalities lack the power to simply cede land use regulatory
power to individual neighborhoods.169 While a few cities have
attempted to delegate zoning powers to defined neighborhood
groups, these efforts generally have not succeeded.170 Between 1912
and 1928, the United States Supreme Court issued three opinions
(Eubank v. City of Richmond,171 Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago172 and
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge173) holding that for the
most part private property owners cannot regulate other property
owners unless the controlling group deregulates a general prohibition
on nuisances.174 These opinions effectively prohibited such delegation
as unlawful abdication of a municipality’s duty to protect the
community’s public health, safety and welfare against the arbitrary

at 387.
168

See Miller, supra note 20, at 163–64.
See Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future of the City, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 939, 943–45 (2013) (arguing that as a result of this lack of authority, cities
increasingly resort to BIDs as a “default option” to deal with a variety of localized urban
planning issues).
170
See, e.g., Shannon v. City of Forsyth, 666 P.2d 750, 752 (Mont. 1983)
(invalidating a neighbor-consent provision related to the location of mobile homes
under the authority of Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) and
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928)); Cary v. City
of Rapid City, 559 N.W.2d 891, 895–96 (S.D. 1997) (invalidating a neighbor-consent
provision under Eubank and Roberge while ignoring Cusack); Am. Chariot v. City of
Memphis, 164 S.W.3d 600, 602–05 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (invalidating a landownerconsent provision allowing restaurant owners to waive a prohibition on where horsedrawn carriages in certain locations and distinguishing Cusack on the grounds that the
ordinance here was for the benefit of the public, while the ordinance in Cusack solely
benefitted local property owners); Williams v. Whitten, 451 S.W.2d 535, 536–38 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1970) (invalidating a neighbor-consent provision regarding location of
mobile home parks, citing Roberge); County of Fairfax v. Fleet Indus. Park Ltd. P’ship,
410 S.E.2d 669, 670, 673 (Va. 1991) (distinguishing Cusack, but nonetheless using
Eubank principles to invalidate a provision conditioning zoning changes upon
neighbors’ consent). See also infra notes 171 & 172 and accompanying text pertaining
to the United States Supreme Court cases.
171
Eubank, 226 U.S. at 137.
172
Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
173
Roberge, 278 U.S. at 116.
174
See Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, NonDelegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 941–43 (2014); See
also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 677 (1976).
169
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exercise of selfish or coercive power.175 Nonetheless, a few cities have
experimented with methods to confer land use powers upon
On occasion, particularly powerful
neighborhood groups.176
neighborhood groups in certain cities featuring citywide citizen
participation systems have successfully integrated themselves into the
political process, but this is a rare event.177 It seems that a key to viability
among citizen-based organizations engaged in land use planning is
that they be meaningfully constrained by a large, diverse governmental
body counteracting any threats of exploitation or other welfarereducing actions by these entities.178
i.

“Planned Community” Citizens’ Organizations: Adept
at Saying “No”

Associations of homeowners, or HOAs, arose as a means to offset
tax burdens and to shift costs from residential developers to residents
(through these associations) during and following project build-outs.179
Unfortunately, however, the operation of an HOA as a planningadvisory body faces too many hurdles.180 For instance, HOAs make
175

ARDEN H. RATHKOPF, DAREN A. RATHKOPF & EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF’S
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 43:15, § 61:30 (2014) (As a “separate independent
restriction or standard,” a “consent requirement” may be held invalid as a
“standardless and unlawful delegation of legislative power to a private group of
property owners.”); see Volokh, supra note 174, at 942–43 (citing Carter v. Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936)); see also 8 EUGENE MCQUILLIAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
25.35 at 111 (3d. ed., 2000) (explaining that zoning powers may not be delegated to
private parties or property owners); Stahl, supra note 169, at 957–62 (citing Eubank,
226 U.S. at 137; Roberge, 278 U.S. at 116; and Thomas Cusack Co., 242 U.S. at 526). Stahl
believes that the fatal flaw in neighborhood zoning districts is their “public-choice”
foundationthat landowners “are permitted to exercise regulatory power in
accordance with their own selfish interests rather than employing some notion of the
public good.” Stahl, supra note 169, at 962. The public-choice view of local
government, Stahl explains, posits “that a homogeneous governing entity is more
efficient than a heterogeneous one because [the former] can directly affect [sic] the
unanimous will of the public without such inefficiencies of vote-trading, such as
conflict, bureaucracy, pork-barrel spending, and wealth redistribution.” Id. at 970.
Thus, the requirement of property owners’ consent to change in land use typically is
viewed as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. See, e.g., Roberge, 278
U.S. at 122 (“A legislature may not delegate its authority to private persons over whom
the legislature has no supervision or control.”); Emmett McLaughlin Realty, Inc. v.
Pima Cnty., 58 P.3d 39, 41–42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Indus. Comm’n v. C & D
Pipeline, Inc., 607 P.2d 383, 385 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)).
176
JEFFREY M. BERRY, KENT E. PORTNEY & KEN THOMSON, THE REBIRTH OF URBAN
DEMOCRACY 141 (1993).
177
Id. at 289.
178
See Stahl, supra note 169, at 1004.
179
See Miller, supra note 20, at 161–62.
180
See JOHN WHITCOMB, THE ZEC GUIDE: A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING ZERO ENERGY
COMMUNITIES 160 (2014) (positing that the leadership, innovation, and financial and
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operating decisions that impact narrow agendas, primarily keeping
owners’ fractional shares of maintenance costs economical and
incoming while arresting improvements or other owner actions that
appear to threaten property values (from the perspective of their
boards’ members).181 Additionally, HOA charters do not grant
authority to forge relations with their governing jurisdiction or any
other persons, “except as it might directly affect the HOA’s
operations.”182 Further, an HOA’s tendency to micromanage within its
subdivisions misses the larger picture of community development
impacts.183 HOAs as a whole illustrate the danger of disaggregating
zoning power from other municipal functions and the attendant risks
that zoning decisions will be made without consideration of their
impacts on these other city functions.184
ii.

Citizen Planning Committees (Multilateral
Associations)185

An early illustration of citizen vehicles for growth-planning input
was Detroit’s Citizen District Councils, created by a 1945 Michigan law
intended to stimulate urban growth while granting residents a voice in
development.186 Council members were elected by residents and
property owners of the zones they represented. While these council
technical expertise required for a zero energy community governing board “far exceed
the capacity and operating capabilities required for a HOA.”).
181
See GARY POLIAKOFF & RYAN POLIAKOFF, NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE CONSUMER’S
GUIDE TO CONDOMINIUM, CO-OP AND HOA LIVING 70, 146–55, 206 (2009); Cohen &
Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 130.
182
See Miller, supra note 20, at 162.
183
See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 131 (noting the “excessive
restrictions” imposed by self-regulating HOAs); Miller, supra note 20, at 162.
184
See William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment
on Robert Nelson’s “Privatizing the Neighborhood,” 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 881, 899–901
(1999); see also David L. Callies et al., Ramapo Looking Forward: Gated Communities,
Covenants, and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 197 (2003) (“[Any] privatized ‘zoning’
effort itself results in uncoordinated land use planning of the area. . . . Air quality,
property values, environmental preservation, efficient public services, and well-located
schools all are better coordinated by a more regional government responsible for the
region’s public services.”).
185
For discussions of these types of land use focused alliances, primarily non-profit
corporations, see Jessica Spelke Jansujwicz & Aram J.K. Calhoun, Chapter 10: Protecting
Natural Resources on Private Lands: The Role of Collaboration in Land Use Planning, in
LANDSCAPE-SCALE CONSERVATION PLANNING (Steven C. Trombulak & Robert Baldwin
eds., 2010). See also Tarry Hum, Planning in Neighborhoods with Multiple Publics:
Opportunities and Challenges for Community-Based Nonprofit Organizations, 29 J. PLANNING
EDUC. & RESEARCH 461–77 (2010).
186
Nancy Kaffer, Duggan Must Find Way to Give Citizens a Voice, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Oct.
2,
2014),
http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancykaffer/2014/10/02/citizens-district-detroit-orr-duggan/16549889/.

WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

SHARED SPATIAL REGULATING

11/3/2015 2:56 PM

147

members never wielded actual authority over planning decisions, they
sometimes used their positions to block projects seemingly
destabilizing to neighborhoods.187 Kevin Orr, Detroit’s emergency
manager, abolished these councils as he phased out his role in late
2014.188
Cities developing special zoning “vicinities” to protect specific
enclaves or regions have spawned within the district boundaries’
associations to interpret and apply detailed regulations for
neighborhood preservation or enhancement.189 For example, the City
of Phoenix has fifteen urban villages pursuant to its General Plan, each
with a Village Planning Committee (VPC) providing guidance on a
wide range of local and citywide issues, including those addressing
implementation of the City’s General Plan.190 A VPC’s positions are
advisory to the City Planning Commission and the City Council on
matters involving new zoning initiatives or major amendments to the
General Plan for the City.191 Its findings are not binding, and both the
Planning Commission and City Council may act on cases without input
from the affected VPC.192
San Francisco has more than twenty neighborhood commercial
districts, each having a specific Planning Code section containing
tailored regulations.193 Like Phoenix’s Urban Villages, these districts
originated in the 1980s in response to perceived problems
accompanying commercial growth in ten neighborhoods surrounding
city commercial streets.194 Implementing so-called “formula retail”

187

See id.
Id.
189
See Miller, supra note 20, at 149.
190
See The Village Planning Handbook, CITY OF PHX. PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT,
https://www.phoenix.gov/pddsite/Documents/pdd_pz_pdf_00020.pdf.
191
Id. at 6.
192
Id.
193
See Neighborhood District Zoning Control Table, S. F. PLANNING DEP’T (Sept. 22,
2008), available at http://www.sf-planning.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?
documentid=3561. All such regulations are found in Article 7 of the San Francisco
Planning Code. S.F., CAL. PLANNING CODE art. 7, §§ 701–09 (2015), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/California/planning/planningcode?f=te
mplates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:sanfrancisco_ca$sync=1.
The
use
definitions for these districts, consisting of nearly sixty parts, appear at id. at § 790.
194
See Mark Cohen, San Francisco’s Neighborhood Commercial Special Use District
Ordinance: An Innovative Approach to Commercial Gentrification, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 367, 369–70 (1983). One mission of these districts is to minimize dominance of
formula retailers merchants featuring formulaic floor plans and inventories
capitalizing on economies of scale while deadening the shoppers’ experiences of
novelty and locality.
188

WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE)

148

11/3/2015 2:56 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:111

establishments remains a persistent concern in these districts; such
establishments trigger a conditional use hearing before the City’s
Planning Commission. In November, 2006, city voters passed a
proposition whereby chain retailers operating eleven or more stores
must receive a conditional use permit from the city to open a branch
in a neighborhood commercial district.195 To approve the permit, the
Planning Commission must find the applicant’s tenancy both
“necessary and desirable.” Neighbors within the planning areas
comment at the Planning Commission hearing in support of findings,
and the commission has denied permits following neighbor inputs.196
To some fanfare, San Francisco Mayor Edwin Lee convened the city’s
Sharing Economy Working Group in March 2012,197 to explore means
to encourage a “shareable city”198 among its citizens. While this body
may eventually address emerging planning issues concerning the
sharing economy (possibly leading to additional Neighborhood
Commercial Districts or modifications of existing regulations), it has
never met from its public introduction through mid-2014, apart from
a brief kickoff gathering in April 2012.199
iii. Business Improvement Districts
Due to its consultative nature, the Business Improvement District
(BID) model provides slight insight regarding how to augment
inclusiveness on a relatively small scale.200 BIDs restrict participation,
195

S.F., CAL. PLANNING CODE art. 7, § 703.3 (2015); see Formula Business Restriction,
INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Jan. 16, 2015), http://ilsr.org/rule/formula-businessrestrictions/2321-2/.
196
See, e.g., Amy Farah Weiss, Support Local Economic Development, THE BAY CITIZEN
BLOG (July 25, 2011, 1:53 PM), https://www.baycitizen.org/blogs/citizenblog/support-local-economic-development-4/.
197
Hunter Franks, The Civic Innovation System Blooms in 2012, SF MAYOR’S OFFICE OF
CIVIC INNOVATION (Jan. 11, 2013), http://innovatesf.com/category/citizenengagement/.
198
See DAVID BOLLIER, THINK LIKE A COMMONER: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE LIFE
OF THE COMMONS 134–35 (2014).
199
See Joe Eskenazi, City for Let: The Sharing Economy Proves it can Do Whatever it Wants,
SF WEEKLY NEWS (May 14, 2014), http://www.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/city-for-letthe-sharing-economy-proves-it-can-do-whatever-it-wants/Content?oid=2949607;
Patrick Hoge, Critics Slam Mayor Lee’s Phantom “Sharing Economy” Working Group, S.F.
BUS.
TIMES
(May
7,
2014,
1:49
PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/2014/05/mayor-leessharing-economy-task-force-never-met.html.
200
The initial establishment of a BID requires the support of the majority of
affected land and business owners, so consultation underpins the existence of these
public-private partnerships that exist to provide services formerly (or partially) in the
government domain but also intervene in district land use planning decisions that are
a prerogative of local government. See Elisabeth Peyroux et al., Business Improvement
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however, to business and property owners authorized by local
ordinance to collect additional property assessments from their
designated geographical areas to spend on additional services not
provided (or underprovided) by their local governments.201 Saddled
with limited goals, BIDs are less-perfect models of civic participation
and lack those qualities of true deliberation and inclusion;202 for
instance, “they fail to mix residents in the neighborhood with others
who have stakes in the same area, such as educators, employers and
environmentalists.”203 This article provides no additional coverage to
this model because rarely is it truly inclusive, as BIDs nearly always are
self-interested and outcome-oriented instead of process-oriented.204
2. Newer Models of Citizen-Driven Organizations for Land
Use Oversight
Airbnb’s chief executive, Brian Chesky, told The Atlantic magazine
in 2014 that trust, mediated by technology, was joining the paradigm
of the village in making a comeback. Specifically, he said, “[a]t the
most macro level, I think we’re going to go back to the village, and
cities will become communities again. . . . I’m not saying they’re not
communities now, but I think that we’ll have this real sensibility and
everything will be small.”205 For Chesky’s observation to become
accurate, communities must first determine what properly scaled units
of village regulation look like. Oregon, for instance, features small
town-sized units that revise local zoning district maps and associated
plans.206 Yet, Oregon’s state agency, the Land Conservation and
Development Commission, regulates land use goals and guidelines,
Districts (BIDs): The Internationalization and Contextualization of a ‘Travelling Concept,’ 19
EUROP. URB. & REG’L STUD. 111, 112–13 (2012).
201
See Barbara L. Bezdek, Citizen Engagement in the Shrinking City: Toward Development
Justice in an Era of Growing Inequality, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 15 (2013), Peyroux,
supra note 200, at 112–13.
202
See Bedzek, supra note 201, at 3, 15.
203
Id.
204
See id. Peyroux, supra note 200, at 113 notes that the design of public spaces
according to commercial interest of BIDs risks promoting land use policy that excludes
“objectionable” social groups such as the less affluent.
205
Uri Friedman, Airbnb CEO: Cities Are Becoming Villages, THE ATLANTIC (June 29,
2014) http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/airbnb-ceo-citiesare-becoming-villages/373676/.
206
An Introductory Guide to Land Use Planning for Small Cities and Counties in Oregon,
OREGON DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEV. 2 (Jan. 2007),
http://www.oregon.gov/lcd/docs/publications/introductory_guide_to_land_use_pl
anning_in_oregon.pdf (explaining that local governments provide opportunities for
citizen involvement and set standards for how certain types of land are planned and
zoned; but these acts must conform to state planning goals).

WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE)

150

11/3/2015 2:56 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:111

and ultimately determines if local-jurisdiction planning documents
comply with those regulations207—irrefutably centralized planning.
Disaster planning in some cities seems to be devolving to the smallest
neighborhood units, but this type of planning is directed to lifethreatening emergencies—a different set of tools addressing different
circumstances.208
Advocates of localizing land use governance seek regulation from
the base upwards,209 instead of from the apex downwards, without
resolving the foundational question how, if at all, agencies of land use
regulation survive separate from familiar trust-institutions from which
residential dwellers sense familiarity and protection. The public’s
dilemma is whether we can ensure that the properly-scaled governance
unit truly represents all sharing producers and residents within the
unit’s boundaries. Otherwise, as Mariana Valverde points out, local
bylaws impose a set of culturally-biased ideals.210 Legal standards
defining “cleanliness” and “tranquility,” for example, mirror aesthetic
and moral ideals of an established, usually ethnic majority, group. In
many American cities, mostly white, middle-aged, middle- or upperclass property owners dominate rule-making, as these persons own
most of the urbanized real property.211 Deciding who defines these
ideals affords different ethnic and socioeconomic groups with varying
degrees of legal protection, usually entrenching established
inequalities.212 Some sharing producers suspect regulations exist for
improper purposes, such as protecting existing businesses, garnering
community revenue and underwriting bureaucracy.213
As a
consequence, these sharing producers prefer to remain out of sight
and, when needed, seek subsequent forgiveness rather than
207

PAUL G. LEWIS, SHAPING SUBURBIA: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ORGANIZE
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 111–12 (1996).
208
See, e.g., Jim Carlton, San Francisco Readies for the Big One, a Block at a Time, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2014, 7:39 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/san-francisco-readies-forthe-big-one-a-block-at-a-time-1416443960?tesla=y.
209
See KARL KEHDE, COLLABORATIVE LAND USE PLANNING (4th ed. 2007); ROGER J.
MASON, COLLABORATIVE LAND USE MANAGEMENT (2008).
210
MARIANA VALVERDE, EVERYDAY LAW ON THE STREET: CITY GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE
OF DIVERSITY 49–54 (2012).
211
See id. at 49, 58–59.
212
Id. at 22, 78–79, 84–85. This bias, Valverde claims, is reinforced by city
bureaucrats who enforce inherently biased rules, and local elected officials, who
cherry-pick issues to champion based on interest group politics. See id. at 21, 80–84.
Valerde calls the resulting system “village elder politics” and “rule by aesthetic.” See id.
at 103–05, 227.
213
See, e.g., Scott Beyer, The Motor City’s Regulators Are Hitting the Brakes on Regrowth,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2014, 6:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/scott-beyer-themotor-citys-regulators-are-hitting-the-brakes-on-regrowth-1418426736.
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permission from administrators at the outsets of their endeavors.214
Accordingly, a sub-city regulatory unit desiring credibility must learn
of the sharing producers and prosumers dwelling in that district and
involve them, intimately, in the regulatory decision-making process, to
assure them that their inputs will be thoughtfully considered.
This engagement imperative is more easily spoken than achieved.
Residents, especially long-time neighbors resistant to change, have
legitimate claims that “they arrived first,” and that “they built this
community” through their investments of money and energy. It
requires conditioning to educate such residents that a healthier mix of
people facilitates exchanges of trade, labor and sociability—producing
more robust community life.215 Next, it is important to persuade
intransigent dwellers that introducing maker spaces and home
businesses does not mandate visiting unfair cost burdens upon
established communities, so long as a plan is implemented first to
ensure that new neighborhood entrants mitigate negative externalities
and otherwise offset increased economic burdens to the enclave.216
On the part of sharing producers and prosumers, initial
education includes wresting their acknowledgement of the long-time
neighbors’ claims and conceding that multi-party deliberation, not
asserting “operations entitlement” as a matter of fundamental property
rights, better promotes acceptance of new business models within
residential areas. Deliberation means genuinely discussing problems
and proposed solutions to them and in the process: (a) justifying each
faction’s preferences to the others; and (b) indicating willingness to
refine those preferences under conditions of public reasoning, mutual
respect, recognition of the other faction’s legitimacy and inclusion of
inputs from differing interests.217
214

See id.
Cf. Bezdek, supra note 201, at 5.
216
See, e.g., LuigART Maker’s Spaces, FAYETTE ALLIANCE (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://fayettealliance.com/luigart-makers-spaces/ (providing that a site inventory
and analysis is conducted to establish the baseline conditions of a proposed project,
including a maximum vehicular use study, in turn forming the basis for written
guidelines by which the Planning Staff and Planning Commission can evaluate future
development plans associated with the project). In October, 2014, Article 22 of
Lexington-Fayette County, KY’s Zoning Ordinance was amended to establish a
Planned Unit Development-2 (PUD-2) ZONE. See LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY KY.,
ZONING ORDINANCE art 22B, available at http://www.lexingtonky.gov/
Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=29196.
217
Bezdek, supra note 201, at 9. See also id. at 32–35 (describing deliberative
components and decision-making methods). In effect, such deliberation will be a
form of district-wide “visioning.” See Widener, supra note 163, at 35–36, 39–46
(describing district-wide visioning in greater detail). As Professor Bezdek notes,
funding in redevelopment occurring under the federal Community Development
215
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Thus far, the existing neighborhood mechanism that seems most
adaptable to the deliberation model is the negotiated contract.
Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) may be the result of sharing
entrepreneurs’ negotiated peace with skeptical adjoining neighbors
instead of agreements with planning administrators. Under CBAs, the
sharing producers must “pay it forward” by contributing to the
infrastructure, like Internet and communications technologies’ (ICT)
upgrades or “marketplace” enhancements within the District (such as
installing bicycle racks), accommodating persons intimately affected
by the later arrivals’ activities. Under such agreements, the following
sorts of stipulations may frame the sharing producer’s operation
entitlements:
a. Neighborhood enforcement mechanisms set forth by
community-based non-profit organizations;
b. Sanctions including the forfeiture of cash bonds or the
posting of other monetary security posted as a pledge of
continued performance of standards, such as limiting noise
levels, hours of operation, and traffic and parking generation;
and
c. Mandatory conciliation among disputants prior to involving
government authorities in prosecuting actions over violations
of the District’s bargained-for agreement.
Many of these conventions are highly appropriate to the
conditions of the sharing economy’s injection into the community.
The flaw in these contractual solutions is that agreement takes too long
to reach, especially when multiple stakeholders engage in
negotiations. Without some preexisting system in place (similar to a
payback or repayment agreement, under which, upon commencing
operation, each sharing producer in turn makes some fair-share cash
payments in return for “setting up shop” in a District) under a prearranged “master” agreement governing all similarly situated Sharing
Enterprises, formal agreements consume substantial time when
reached between the District and each sharing producer seriatim.

Block Grant Program is conditioned upon preparing and executing a citizen
participation plan. Bezdek, supra note 201, at 13.

WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

11/3/2015 2:56 PM

SHARED SPATIAL REGULATING

153

3. A Proposal for Inclusiveness of Stakeholders in Sharing
Economy Districts
The following structure involves stakeholders’ inclusion in
determining proper integration of sharing producers in a
neighborhood.
It borrows somewhat from Los Angeles’
Neighborhood Councils, which have been in effect since City Charter
revision in 1999.218 Los Angeles has ninety-five neighborhood councils
that intend to be diverse, inclusive, and representative of all
community stakeholders and to be catalysts for change in addressing
the needs of their individual communities.219 This network of councils
is overseen by the Board of Neighborhood Commissioners (the
“Commission”), which is itself an inclusive body comprised of seven
persons with diverse backgrounds and geographic locations appointed
by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council.220 The Commission
meets twice monthly unless special meetings are called.221 The
proposed structure might be staffed by a city employee (preferably a
planning staff member) to be the Districts’ “information officer”
overseeing a robust public website, giving regularly-scheduled
briefings and providing technical assistance to what are known below
as “District Councils.”
The District Councils govern certain planning aspects within each
District, defined by the community as one or more self-identified
neighborhoods sharing a common character due to ethnic
composition, geographic delimitations, or some other community of

218

About Us, L.A. NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL COAL., http://www.lancc.org/ (last
visited Sept. 12, 2015); see L.A., CAL., CITY CHARTER art. IX, §§ 900–914 (2015), available
at
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/California/laac/administrativecode?f=te
mplates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:losangeles_ca_mc; L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE,
div. 22, § 22.801 (2015), available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/
gateway.dll/California/laac/administrativecode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid
=amlegal:losangeles_ca_mc; L.A., Cal., Ordinance, 174006 (effective May 31, 2001),
available at http://www.lacityneighborhoods.com/Documents/PlanOrdinance.pdf
(implementing the plan for the citywide system of councils).
219
Commission, EMPOWERLA: DEP’T OF NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT,
http://empowerla.org/commission/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015) [hereinafter
EmpowerLA]; cf. Bedzek, supra note 201, at 48–49 (emphasizing the importance of
identifying those who usually are voiceless or deliberately excluded from input in
order to maximize credibility and neighborhood acceptance of the process).
According to the implementing ordinance, a proposed Neighborhood Council should
represent approximately 20,000 residents at a minimum. L.A., Cal., Ordinance 174006
(effective May 31, 2001).
220
EmpowerLA, supra note 219.
221
Id.
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interest.222 Following their appointment by the community’s planning
commission,223 these Councils begin their work by conducting a public
“convention” at which, after public deliberation,224 they identify sites
where sharing producer operation is optimal and establish
compatibility categories.225 Effectively setting forth these propositions
as a sort of mini “general plan,”226 the Councils are tasked with
overhauling that plan at short-duration intervals (between three to five
years), and reviewing, after public deliberation, the efficacy of the plan
at even more frequent intervals (perhaps annually).227
Equipped with a schedule of compatibility categories,228 cityappointed hearing officers, being persons not living in the district,
initially apply these standards to applications for Sharing Enterprise
operation within a neighborhood. The hearing officers impartially
receive evidence and testimony on a proposed sharing producer’s use
from the applicant, who testifies under oath. The hearing officers are
asked presumptively to approve each application,229 subject to
222

Cf. Timothy A. Holveck, Land Use Lingo: A Glossary of Land Use Terms, WISCONSIN
DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES 19 (2001), http://www.kalkaskacounty.net/downloads/
land_use_lingo.pdf.
223
Appointment by Planning Commissioners (in those communities where they
are not elected officials) does not ensure fewer “patronage” appointees than if the
city’s legislative body appoints them; but such a method may render members less
prone to member “obligation-discharging”—if the planning commissioners
themselves are not prone to “deal-making.” (In some communities, the Council and
the Planning Commission have identical memberships.)
224
I use this term deliberately to differentiate it from the venue of a public hearing
which, as Professor Bedzek notes, affords no real deliberative dialog among attendees
and tends to be vitriolic instead of civil. See Bedzek, supra note 201, at 33, 35.
225
See infra Part IV.C.
226
Cf. Richard White, Mini-downtowns a Growing Trend in Calgary’s Growth, CALGARY
HERALD (Nov. 19, 2014), http://calgaryherald.com/life/homes/condos/white-minidowntowns-a-growing-trend-in-calgarys-growth (noting that city’s adoption of “major
activity centers” around the city after extensive community engagement).
227
Cf. Sofia Ranchordas, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the
Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 450 (2015). Professor Ranchordas
suggests that because innovations arise incrementally, regulators should implement
flexible regulations in a continuous process of experimentation and learning, and
those regulations optimally incorporate a sunset clause. See id. at 450–51. This
experimentation model seems suited to District determinations such as siting
“enclaves” for aggregated Sharing Enterprises and reexamining its compatibility
categories; implementing some Sharing Enterprises allows for District “test case”
review and deliberation on whether (or not) to rework compatibility categorization or
to adopt zoning overlay districts to regulate sharing producers. Too-frequent revision
of plans on the District (or the community-legislative) level, however, reflects an ad hoc
approach undermining confidence in residents concerned about predictability and
safety.
228
See infra Part IV.C.
229
See Miller, supra note 1, at 7 (“[T]he regulatory response should be based upon

WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

SHARED SPATIAL REGULATING

11/3/2015 2:56 PM

155

stipulations of approval (“Conditions”),230 unless that evidence or
testimony adduced establishes that the proposed Sharing Enterprise is
deemed likely to be highly incompatible, in which event the hearing
officer can deny the application altogether. In either event, the
hearing officer assigns the specific compatibility category (based upon
the Councils’ initial work) she deems suitable based upon hearing
evidence.
If the hearing officer’s approval of the application is protested,
the matter is next subject to conciliation,231 conducted by a public
official or her designee, between the applicant Sharing Enterprise and
protestors. If the conciliation does not lead to an accommodation
agreement,232 the protest next is heard by a subcommittee of the
Council established without any participant residing in the impacted
District. This appellate body has no authority to modify the proposed
use’s specific compatibility category; and it will uphold the hearing
officer’s determination of denial of an application unless, by a
supermajority vote of that body (the majority vote’s percentage being
tied to the compatibility category), it is determined that the Sharing
Enterprise has adequately addressed mitigating negative externalities.
If the Council’s subcommittee upholds the denial of the permit, the
sharing producer must wait a minimum of six months before reapplying to the Council for the same or a similar Sharing Enterprise
on the same street,233 or a minimum of ninety days before re-applying
regulating the entry of the sharing economy platform into the existing market, as well
as the new market created.”).
230
See Miller, supra note 1, at 44 (citing “good neighbor” rules like noise
stipulations requiring a “quiet time” and limiting commercial activity during evening
hours, parking regulations addressing on-street parking and parking permits in
residential zones, and trash guidelines).
231
By “conciliation,” I mean a conference involving the stakeholders and a neutral
person whose goals are to maintain civility and to attempt to generate an atmosphere
of mutual trust. Mediation, while often useful, renders the conference directed by a
trained expert (whose expenses must be paid by the parties), a person who may be
more interested in the deliberation process than in the inclusion of resident and
sharing producer inputs, or another party with no experience in trust-building
methods. A District Council member with no stake in the particular application’s
outcome or relationship to a stakeholder may be appropriate to “moderate” the
conciliation meeting, if she is properly trained in her role.
232
The accommodation agreement, if reached, would be forwarded to the Hearing
Officer for review, to determine whether the agreement has addressed the issues
identified by that official in reaching the compatibility category. In such event, the
Hearing Officer may reopen the hearing for the purpose of making a revised
determination, perhaps incorporating the conditions discussed by the conciliation’s
participants.
233
The “cooling off” period serves to allow further consultation among the
stakeholders and further refinement of the Sharing Enterprise’s business model in
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in the same District but in a substantially different location within its
boundaries. The sharing producer applicant further can appeal the
Commission’s denial to the community’s Planning Commission,234 but
must first submit a narrative to that body that explains in detail those
modifications and mitigation efforts the Sharing Enterprise will make,
responding to issues raised by protestors in the conciliation meeting
that caused the applicant’s failure to receive approval.
If the hearing officer’s approval of the sharing use is not protested
or ultimately “upheld” over a protest, then, upon securing any needed
business license, the exterior of the building housing the sharing use
will be physically tagged235 to identify Sharing Enterprise approval. A
Council review of the Sharing Enterprise operation must be conducted
shortly after the anniversary of commencement of that use.236 No
matter how the Sharing Enterprise is finally approved, if it “fails” its
anniversary review or is the subject of later enforcement due to
violation of the Conditions, the approval tag will be replaced with a
new or “reprogrammed” tag, indicating the Sharing Enterprise has
violated the Conditions or other applicable laws and, therefore, that
the use is scheduled for a hearing on revocation of the approval.237 Any
city agency, a membership trade association to which the sharing user
belongs, or the Council shall have the right to act as complainant to
revoke the prior city approval.
This process entails a good deal of bureaucracy compared to
existing special exception and dimensional variance hearing
processes. On the other hand, this proposal offsets much of the
recurring criticisms that variance-granting bodies pay little to no
attention to legal limitations on their powers238 and that public
light of neighbor inputs.
234
Again, final say in a municipal zoning matter must be voiced by a municipal
legislative body. See supra text accompanying notes 155–67.
235
The author suggests tagging by using, on a building’s exterior, any of a QR Code
plaque, a Near Field Communication (NFC) and an accompanying information tag
(or an unpowered NFC chip) or some future form of “visible light communication”
(such as that being developed by Fujitsu under its “Li-Fi” technology). See Keith E.
Mayers, Lazaros Kyrillidis, Konstantinos Markantonakis and Song Dong, A Brief
Comparison of NFC Smart Posters and Quick Response Codes, NFC & CONTACTLESS 74–78
(2012), available at http://www.crisptelecom.com/files/nfcworld.pdf.
236
This is not to support an elaborate bureaucracy but to ensure that the applicant
did not misrepresent his or her true operating intentions and possible neighborhood
repercussions.
237
Additionally, any trade group incorporating the Sharing Enterprise identified
by the applicant will be notified to encourage that group to sanction the sharing
producer by private penalization.
238
See, e.g., Randall W. Sampson, Theory and Practice in the Granting of Dimensional
Land Use Variances: Is the Legal Standard Conscientiously Applied, Consciously Ignored, or
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hearings are not deliberative moments, becoming platforms for
emotionally-driven outcomes or the airing of prearranged outcomes
instead.239
C. Determining Sharing Enterprise Neighborhood Compatibility
Standards
“[P]recisely the many small-scale nonresidential uses on the
street . . . are responsible for much of the increased attractiveness and
value of the street for residence. . . . [T]hey make the street interesting
and safe.”240 “[N]o arguments arise over their desirability. The
arguments . . . revolve around the question of what kind of [zoning]
categories . . . will be least at odds with the needs of real life.”241
The community should establish standards, following hearings
before the Councils,242 on Sharing Enterprises’ levels of compatibility
with any District’s special character and circulation patterns.243 While
Districts’ inputs are instrumental, the community ultimately must have
final say on compatibility through its general or comprehensive plan,
nearly always a creature of enabling legislation for urban planning.244
This is because District boundaries likely are the centers of municipal
Something in Between, 39 URB. LAW. 877, 894–905 (2007).
239
See Bedzek, supra note 201, at 16, 26–27; JACOBS, supra note 26, at 406 (“In many
cases . . . it has all been decided before they are heard.”).
240
JACOBS, supra note 26, at 236.
241
Id. at 235. Jacobs’ grievance with “monotonous” city zoning categorization was
that it confused scale of use, instrumental in neighborhood planning, with kind of use;
Jacobs argued that the latter dimension, misapplied, would lead to visual “street
disintegration.” See id. at 234–38. To Jacobs, segregating uses no matter their size or
empiric effect needlessly suppressed diversity of street life. See id. at 238. The very
same large-scale fragmenting of the street’s visual harmony causes other negative
externalities like traffic generation, street parking consumption, heightened levels of
noise and other sensory overloading. While all those impacts may not be perfect
recipes for neighborhood “tranquility,” a certain quantum of these impacts are part of
street activation—in short, the cost of place-making. This constitutes a District
question of balancing the costs and benefits of these externalities.
242
See infra notes 249–52 and accompanying text at subparts A–E, infra.
243
Indeed, some Districts may propose municipal adoption of overlay or special
planning zoning districts by the City Council or other principal legislative body of their
community allowing, as of right, living and working arrangements within the same
structure. See, e.g., ROBERT STEUTEVILLE & PHILIP LANGDON, NEW URBANISM:
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT & BEST PRACTICES GUIDE § 6-6–6-7, 10-20 (2003) (explaining
that terms employed are “flex house” (or unit) and “shopfront house” (or unit)).
244
See Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 353 (1955). While neighborhood level planning is advocated
in some quarters, these plans must be compatible with the core strategy of the local
authority (and formally adopted by that authority) to be effective. See HUGH BARTON,
MARCUS GRANT & RICHARD GUISE, SHAPING NEIGHBORHOODS: FOR LOCAL HEALTH AND
GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY 8 (2010) [hereinafter BARTON & GRANT].
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streets or edges (or centers) of other public spaces and because the
impacts of some uses are felt in adjacent Districts or perhaps more
regionally, such as in the community’s transit network. Next, the
community must have final approval rights because in many states, the
statutory scheme requires the approval of a general or master plan at
the elected local community official level.245 Legislative bodies have,
and must continue, to decide the proper mix of land use classes,
although local governments should not dictate specific locations of
these uses within a District’s boundaries without citizen input.246 But a
city’s legislative body must ensure that a minority fraction of the
Districts are not disproportionately (and unwillingly) hosts of these
uses—unless less risk-adverse or more entrepreneurial Districts
affirmatively seek additional Sharing Enterprises’ inclusion within
their boundaries.247
The community must likewise assist the Districts in determining
their individual “saturation points,” as it has the legal responsibility to
245

See State of California General Plan Guidelines, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING &
RESEARCH
3
(2003),
available
at
http://opr.ca.gov/docs/General_Plan_
Guidelines_2003.pdf (stating that each county and city must adopt a comprehensive,
long term general plan); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-461.06(C), (M) (2015) (West)
(illustrating a statute governing municipal planning that requires the “governing
body” of an Arizona municipality to adopt the general plan).
246
The City of Seattle uses the phrase “live-work unit,” defining it as:
[A] structure or portion of a structure: (1) that combines a commercial
or manufacturing activity that is allowed in the zone with the residential
living space for the owner of the commercial or manufacturing business,
or the owner’s employee, and that person’s household; (2) where the
resident owner or employee of the business is responsible for the
commercial or manufacturing activity performed; and (3) where the
commercial or manufacturing activity conducted takes place subject to
a valid business license associated with the premises.
SEATTLE, WASH., MUNI. CODE., § 23.84A.024(L). By definition, Seattle live-work units
can have a commercial or manufacturing component if it would otherwise be allowed
in the zone. Seattle’s Residential-Commercial zone allows live-work units and the
following commercial uses outright: personal and household retail sales and services,
medical services, restaurants, business support services, offices, and food processing
and “craft work.” Id. § 23.46.004(B). In Seattle, live-work units are considered
compatible with these uses. Seattle limits the size of individual businesses to 4,000
square feet. See id. § 23.46.014. This provision limits the size of businesses, thereby
ensuring that large businesses that would jeopardize the residential character of the
neighborhood will not be included.
247
In that event, the entrepreneurial District should familiarize itself with model
code provisions for live-work units, such as those found in Sustainable Land Use Code
Project, CAPITOL REGION COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS 1–3 (June
2013),
http://www.sustainableknowledgecorridor.org/site/sites/default/files/CRCOG_Liv
e-Work_Units_Final_9-30-13.pdf. See also MODEL LAND-DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS 71–
74 (Marya Morris ed., 2008), available at http://austintexas.gov/sites/
default/files/files/Planning/CodeNEXT/PAS_556_4_2_live-work.pdf.
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do so and possesses better intuition about the regional burdens than a
Neighborhood Council with narrower interests than regional
implications.248 The compatibility levels of the proposed uses will
populate the following spectrum:
A. Inherently incompatible uses, where noise, traffic generation,
or other nuisance-oriented factors render a use essentially
dangerous or substantially diminish the quality of life in
surrounding enclaves. In this category, a rare permit grant
will satisfy the classic variance inquiry, in which the applicant
essentially would be deprived, by rejection of the application,
of all economically viable use of the property;249 and even here,
for relief, the applicant would need to provide substantial
(likely expensive) mitigation of negative externalities. One
anticipates the District’s residential-dwelling spokespersons
always will oppose the application and (in all likelihood)
propose some alternate use of the property implicating its
acquisition (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) for the
community leadership’s consideration. The applicant will
probably be required to present some expert testimony on the
extent of nuisance elements (such as a traffic study or noise
measurement by an engineer).
Presumptively, the
application for a use permit in this category will fail in nearly
all cases.
B. Incompatible without substantial mitigation where, albeit not
per se nuisance-creating (as characteristic in the preceding
category), the use requires thorough addressing of its direct
and indirect impacts, whether by reducing the hours of the
proposed use’s operation or physical treatments, like
implementing noise-dampening materials, odor filtration,
248

An unavoidable point is how to address the District that seeks to classify all
Sharing Enterprises as “inherently incompatible,” meaning none shall be allowed in
its boundaries. Market forces may persuade sharing producers to avoid such
intolerance and exclusion in the first instance, preferring those Districts that are” most
exuberantly diversified.” See JACOBS, supra note 26, at 255. However, to encourage all
Districts minimally to deliberate upon the utility of increasing mixtures of uses and the
benefits of such diversity, it will be important to appoint to a Neighborhood Council’s
board membership numbers of sharing producers or prosumers who live within the
District’s boundaries. It is worth remembering that solidly residential enclaves may
already have in place contractual restrictive covenants (or General Plan boundaries)
permitting no commercial activities. If there are none of these, the sharing producer
may wish to negotiate first a Good Neighbor Agreement, followed by an application
for a permit.
249
Cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (noting that
situations exist “where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land”).
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smoke-scrubbing, or other substantial mitigation.
(If
licensing of this category of uses were privately controlled,
“trade group” members might require this mitigation as a
condition of that body’s licensing.) One illustration is the
operating of an outdoor batting cage for hitting instruction
conducted nightly for three-hour intervals on a residential lot,
involving multiple youth baseball teams. Limiting operating
hours to before a typical citizen’s bedtime, compelling
acoustical treatment of vibrating-bat noises and requiring
shielding of outdoor pole lighting sources all may contribute
to the acceptability of this use; but the permit’s application
may fail upon District resident opposition, especially if
opponents demonstrate that acceptable alternatives for the
Sharing Enterprise’s location exist within the District’s
boundaries.
C. Incompatible prosumers, where projected volumes of nonlocals-based traffic generation or behaviors exhibited by
visitors to this same or analogous type of use predictably
disturbs the District’s equilibrium.250 A motorcycle repairs
teaching and tools-lending facility illustrate this
circumstance.251
While the facility’s operation may be
professional, inability of the neighbors to know with
confidence who their street’s visitors are and what the noise
level will be, coupled with history of such operations
elsewhere in the community, may lead the District to question
how much this activity contributes to its quality of life.252 In
250

Cf. Aisles Apart, ECONOMIST 36 (Mar. 21, 2015), available at
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21646794-protests-about-mainlandshoppers-reveal-graver-problems-aisles-apart (describing Hong Kong locals’
displeasure with influx of mainland visitors thronging to purchase staples and other
goods, who are identified as strangers, even though many Hong Kong residents
themselves were “mainlanders” migrating to the island in the 20th Century).
251
Worship centers in the 21st Century increasingly are becoming Sharing
Enterprises, especially those with strong congregant convictions about “community
mission.” Operations include pocket shelters, feeding and clothing the disadvantaged,
and numerous on-campus gatherings of the congregation, area service organizations,
and day-care activities. Once a quiet place for small gatherings, worship centers
increasingly are dynamic and engaged with their surrounding communities. See, e.g.,
Christianity and Its Major Branches, in RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FAITH, CULTURE
AND STRATEGIC CHOICES 71 (Robert Booth Fowler, Allen D. Hertzke, Laura R. Olson
& Kevin R. Den Dulk eds., 2010).
252
This illustration is not class-war driven; I regard home-based hair salons
featured in wealthy residential enclaves to be equally objectionable because of hosted
parties that generate traffic. See Nancy Keates, Latest Style: Home Hair Salons, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 15, 2015, 11:56 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/latest-style-home-hairsalons-1421340965. As these residence “parlors” rarely have a live-in stylist, salon
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this permit application, one expects a number of stipulations
proposed by the District’s residential-dwelling representatives
and imposed by the hearing officer.
D. Incompatible due to saturation, where the District has
reached its maximum capacity to absorb additional Sharing
Enterprises. Under these conditions, a zoning permit may be
granted but a city business license may be withheld until
additional capacity is created by closure of another sharing
producer’s business in the District. Without such saturation
limits, well-armed Districts may seek to move sharing
producers to another district; a “saturation limit,” on the
other hand, creates an objective standard that must be
exceeded before justifying recommending denial of every
application based in the now-saturated District.
E. Compatible: An application for a sharing producer’s use will
be approved subject to reasonable stipulations on hours of
operation, maximum on-site capacity of consumers, and other
elements addressing minor public health and safety concerns.
V. “ABSOLUTE” LAND USE DEREGULATION OF THE SHARING ECONOMY
“[T]he legal rules should not target the businesses themselves, but
rather their potential for generating negative externalities. In other
words, the ground rules should permit people to work at home so long
as they do not unduly disrupt their neighbors by doing so.”253
Professor Garnett’s argument above resonates across the sharing
economy’s intersection with land use regulation. Prior to the
December 2007–June 2009 national recession254 (and the slow-recovery
activity in a majestic home no more constitutes a “home occupation” under zoning
ordinances than food-sharing enterprises do in more modest dwellings.
253
Garnett, supra note 70, at 1240. This fifteen-year-old (2001) paper contains a
number of prescient observations addressing current sharing-economy
accommodation dilemmas, among them:
An economic downturn resulting in new rounds of layoffs could wreak
havoc on individuals who only recently exited welfare rolls and may be
barred forever from returning . . . . Home businesses might offer a
partial buffer against these economic realities, leading some [officials]
to consider the option of increasing opportunities to work at home as an
economic development tool. . . . [T]he preference in many zoning
codes for professional rather than commercial [home] occupations
works to the detriment of “techie” companies. . . . Few of these
companies would qualify as “professional” occupations, and many would
require the would-be entrepreneur to produce or sell goods or services.
See id. at 1216–17, 1222.
254
See Press Release, National Bureau of Economic Research (Sept. 20, 2010),
available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.pdf (commenting that the
eighteen-month American recession was the longest since World War II).
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aftermath), her 2001 observations pertained to smaller-scale, lower
revenue-number commercial businesses. Professor Garnett suggested
four better land governance alternatives to wholesale prohibition, the
first being that residents presumptively could operate home
occupations, with local government regulation confined to punishing
abusers of that privilege, perhaps through a quasi-nuisance
administrative adjudicatory process.255 Professor Garnett’s second
suggested approach would allow smaller home businesses as a matter
of right, but require some form of zoning adjustment for “major”
home operations.256 A third option adapts “performance zoning”
principles, under which business operators satisfy development criteria
in advance of their openings and thereby present evidence that
neighborhood disruptions or visible alterations of the neighborhood
landscape will be non-existent or minimal.257 A fourth alternative
allows neighborhoods to rely on recorded restrictive covenants
binding on the land to prohibit such home businesses, a private check
on local government processes, altogether ending the zoning
authorities’ business of regulating home occupations.258 This last
alternative aids only solidly residential subdivisions with a long
continuity of existence and centralized management that have not
255

See Garnett, supra note 70, at 1243. The infirmity in this system, of course, is
that the complainant in many instances would be the immediate neighbor, so that the
fabric of the neighborhood is disrupted by interminable neighbor versus neighbor
contests over power to prescribe behavior. This appears to be San Francisco’s attitude
in respect to its Short-Term Residential Rentals Ordinance, According to Mayor Edwin
Lee: “With this balanced, responsible ordinance in place, San Francisco residents can
share their homes and we can enforce against bad actors to protect the public.” Mayor
Lee Signs Legislation to Regulate Short-Term Residential Rentals In San Francisco, S.F. OFFICE
MAYOR
(Oct.
27,
2014),
http://sfmayor.org/index.
OF
THE
aspx?recordid=691&page=846.
256
See Garnett, supra note 70, at 1242. The art here is to determine the boundary
between “minor” and “major” home-based businesses. Is it based upon square footage
of the business activity’s occupancy, the number of employees “in residence,” the
volume of local streets’ vehicular traffic (including, one imagines, bicycle and
skateboard traffic) generated by the business, the amount of utilities consumed, the
noise level (apart from traffic sounds), or inherent dangers arising from the Sharing
Economy? Indeed, Professor Garnett’s major-minor dichotomy underpins somewhat
this author’s “compatibility categories.” See supra Part IV.C.
257
See Garnett, supra note 70, at 1242–43. In truth, this alternative is similar in kind
to zoning adjustments’ operation in many communities, where special exceptions (or
use permits) are issued only when the applicant demonstrates a lack of material
adverse impacts on the surrounding neighborhood, including minimal generation of
residential vehicle or pedestrian traffic, or of noise, dust, odors, glare, fumes, vibration,
and so on. See RATHKOPF, supra note 175, at § 14.30. This model seems to entail the
business operator’s periodic recertification of standards compliance conducted by a
third-party private standards organization. See Part VI infra.
258
See Garnett, supra note 70, at 1234–35.
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abandoned their original residential characters.
Ultimately one asks whether any actors, public or private, should
regulate land use, instead ceding this prerogative to the “wisdom of
crowds” in Districts where Sharing Enterprises seek to reside. Are
“crowds” sufficiently reliable and robust within their individual
enclaves to regulate Sharing Enterprises? Perhaps it is axiomatic that
complex systems require the inputs of great numbers because their
collective insights are superior to those from handfuls of experts
because of the diversity and breadth of experiences of the masses.259
Some argue, for instance, that the safety benefit of passenger
authentication in car-sharing arose not because of official perceptions
but instead from entrepreneurs creating shared vehicular-use business
models.260 Crowds tend collectively to have more consequential
knowledge than the smartest small cadre of experts;261 and
crowdsourcing is useful in the solution of certain problems such as
navigating traffic jams and aiding disabled motorists in real time, such
as is intended by Waze, Inc.262 Twitter Inc. and IBM have announced
that the latter will have access to the full public stream of tweets back
to Twitter’s foundation to develop new applications and services based
on their information and to offer specific industries access to packets
of data generated by this agglomerated data.263
Crowds, however, tend not to organize and condense what they
know into usable packets of data and information. Crowds also have

259

See Vivek Wadhwa, When Experts Are a Waste of Money, WALL ST. J. THE
ACCELERATORS BLOG (Oct. 27, 2014, 12:10 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/
tag/vivek-wadhwa/. See also Greg Brown, Engaging the Wisdom of Crowds and Public
Judgement for Land Use Planning using Public Participation Geographic Information Systems,
52 AUSTRALIAN PLANNER 1, 2 (2015), available at http://www.landscapemap2.org/
publications/australian_planner_wisdom.pdf. Brown sagely points out the sharp
distinction among mere crowd inputs, the “wisdom of crowds” (where collective
opinion generates superior solutions to a problem than should one individual) and
“public judgement,” where the collaborative product is high quality opinion that is
“firm, consistent, and mindful of consequences.” See id. at 3–4.
260
See Charley Moore, Why Ride Sharing Regulators Should “Tread Lightly,” LINKEDIN
PULSE (Sept. 5, 2013) https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20130905223920-1523803why-ride-sharing-regulators-should-tread-lightly.
261
See SOWELL, supra note 126, at 16–17.
262
Waze urges participation by “millions of drivers out on the roads, working
together towards a common goal: to outsmart traffic and get everyone the best route
to work and back, every day.” “Wazers” who edit and update maps on the Web
interface are rewarded with more points than those who merely are consumers. See
WAZE, https://www.waze.com/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
263
See Don Clark & Yoree Koh, Twitter, IBM to Harness Tweet Data for Business, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 29, 2014, at B6, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/ibm-and-twitterforge-partnership-on-data-analytics-1414601963?.
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the habit of trending,264 instead of seeing a larger picture or engaging
in “second-stage” thinking (anticipating ramifications of
implementing one course of action).265 Trending, and reversing
course, may be inefficient to the point of imposing an unacceptable
cost.266 Furthermore, trending can be manipulated, even distorted, by
technology masters, like schooling fish being re-directed by a
“cyberfish.”267 Communities must consider whether technology can be
applied even-handedly to analyze and process the “wisdom of crowds”
where land-planning is concerned, and exactly whose wisdom is
relevant.268 Should inputs from the portion of the crowd living farther
from the applicant Sharing Enterprise carry equal weight to the crowd
segment living and working adjacent to the sharing producer’s
business? If not, how is the pertinent “crowd” identified for any
264

Indeed, “trending” is a darling of media outlets believing it relevant (and hip)
to report on the latest trends. ABC News’ evening broadcast emphasizes a “trending
now” segment, for example. See ABC NEWS, www.abcnews.go.com/ (last visited Sept.
12, 2015). The point of Twitter “tweet” analytics is to discover regurgitated common
denominators of breaking news and commentary, otherwise known as “trending
topics” or “buzz.” See Analytics, TWITTER, https://analytics.twitter.com/ (last visited
Sept. 12, 2015).
265
See THOMAS SOWELL, APPLIED ECONOMICS: THINKING BEYOND STAGE ONE, 5–7
(2009).
266
See Anindya Ghose, Build a Relationship with People in the ‘Crowd,’ WALL ST. J. THE
ACCELERATORS, Oct. 30, 2014, at B5 (“A very high volume of half-baked ideas brings
with it the overhead cost of evaluating those ideas . . . when ideas aren’t completely
thought-through, they simply create a lot more work for the organization.”).
267
See,
e.g.,
BBC
Trending:
Manipulating
the
Internet,
BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01ndgys (last visited Sept. 12, 2015) (reporting
fake identities to artificially create trends or boost “follower” numbers exploiting
software routines called “bots”); Alok Shukla, Social Media Manipulation Is for Real, Some
Call It as Crowd-Turfing!, MCAFEE BLOG CENTRAL (Dec. 2, 2013),
https://blogs.mcafee.com/consumer/social-media-manipulation-is-for-real-somecall-it-as-crowd-turfing (describing methods of manipulating social media through
automated and manual approaches that are prevalent in many countries such as the
United States and China). See also John Drury et al., Transforming the Boundaries of
Collective Identity: From the ‘Local’ Anti-Road Campaign to ‘Global’ Resistance? 2 SOCIAL
MOVEMENT STUDIES 191–212 (2003) (discussing that collective action becomes possible
when a particular social identity is simultaneously salient and therefore shared among
crowd participants).
268
See Brown, supra note 259, at 9 (“[T]here is an assumption that making good
decisions is about finding the right person or persons with the answer . . . many land
use decisions involve social value decisions that are framed as technical decisions
where experts offer no special insight into social values beyond the capacity of the
crowd itself.”). Perhaps an answer to this dilemma of manipulation will be accelerated
in America by governments’ sharing data gathered with the general public, an
initiative of the Obama Administration under Making Open and Machine Readable the
New Default for Government Information, its Open Data Policy. See Exec. Order No.
13,642, 78 Fed. Reg. 28111 (May 9, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/DCPD-201300318/content-detail.html.
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prospective Sharing Enterprise?269 The democracy element of “crowd
wisdom” must be viewed through the lens of possible distortion of data
mined using technology.
Houston, Texas is the over-cited illustration of the virtue of
eliminating land use regulation.270 Despite its putative lack of zoning,
Houston is not the venue for a land-development free-for-all.271
Development in Houston is regulated through three different
processes.272 The city regulates development through an approval
process that focuses mainly on the impact of land development on
public services.273 New developments, for example, must conform to
performance criteria for public services such as sewer and road
capacity.274 A second regulatory mechanism is private restrictions on
land use adopted through legally enforceable land covenants, or
voluntary restrictions on future land uses by current property owners.275
Real covenants can (and often do) exclude specific uses, such as
commercial enterprises or businesses.276 Still, a surprising number of
parcels are “unrestricted,” particularly in established neighborhoods
of the city, enabling informal market forces, the third “governance”
269

In zoning adjustment public hearings, the author frequently asks advocates and
opponents about their respective residential distances from the application’s site and
rarely is surprised by the smaller numbers of speakers genuinely affected immediately
by the proposed use in the slightest manner; after all, it is a public hearing.
270
See, e.g., ALAN EHRENHALT, THE GREAT INVERSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE
AMERICAN CITY 170–74 (2013); Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. L. &
ECON. 71, 75 (1970).
271
See Samuel R. Staley, The Progressive Roots of Zoning, THE FREEMAN BLOG (Mar. 28,
2012), http://fee.org/freeman/detail/the-progressive-roots-of-zoning.
272
Id.
273
Id. The Houston Planning Commission, which includes citizens, elected
officials, and the Director of Planning and Development, reviews and approves
subdivision and development plats. The Commission also studies and makes
recommendations to City Council on development issues in Houston. See Planning
Commission,
CITY
OF
HOUSTON,
http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/
Commissions/Planning-Commission (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). Finally, Houston’s
City Ordinance enumerates and penalizes public nuisances. See HOUS., TEX., CODE OF
ORDINANCES, § 10-451 (1985), available at https://library.municode.com/
index.aspx?clientId=10123&stateId=43&stateName=Texas.
274
See Staley, supra note 271. Houston’s development is governed by codes that
address how property can be subdivided, while site plans are checked for compliance
with city regulations that include off-street parking, tree and shrub requirements,
setbacks and access. See Planning and Development: Development Ordinances, CITY OF
HOUSTON, http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/DevelopRegs/dev_ord.html (last
visited Aug. 5, 2015).
275
See Staley, supra note 271.
276
See, e.g., Georgette Chapman Phillips, Boundaries of Exclusion, 72 MO. L. REV.
1287, 1302 (2007) (explaining that deed restrictions insure expectations of exclusion
are met).
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mechanism, to regulate dimensions of timing, intensity and place of
development.277
Through Euclidean zoning regulation avoidance, Houston
dramatically speeds up the approval process while enabling the land
market’s effective response to economic trends.278 Under conventional
zoning regimes, securing rezoning for a major project can take years.
In Houston, substantial developments, such as multifamily housing
projects, are approved through its performance-approval system and
are fully constructed within a year.279 Houston’s market-oriented
approach to land use has also allowed it to adapt, building multiple
employment centers to accommodate new economic challenges and
opportunities.280 While Houston was not immune to the recessionary
housing market collapse, its housing market was more resilient and
adaptable to changing circumstances.281
While that convention seems enticing, Houston’s laxer land use
regulatory methods have their critics.282 Its government asserts some
types of control as part of its police power and its trust relationship to
its citizens; as a result, certain projects can be delayed or stymied
altogether. But a city does not need to shed all zoning regimes to inject
sharing producers into neighborhoods. Fundamentally, what sharing
producers need in order to work side by side with dwellers in
residential neighborhoods are these few essential elements:
a. Low barriers to “entry” into new sharing spaces, such as the
opportunity to work from home (combining family
management with entrepreneurial activities) so long as
interference with the lives of other neighbors is not material;
b. Proximity of other informal economy business spaces
(because innovation occurs in physical clustering, as has been
demonstrated time and again283), such as by allowing the
277

See Staley, supra note 271. But see Teddy M. Kapur, Land Use Regulation in Houston
Contradicts the City’s Free Market Reputation, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10045, 10051, 10061–62
(2004), available at http://www.pszjlaw.com/media/publication/427_Kapur%20%20ELR%20land%20use%20regulation.pdf (discussing that, although perhaps threefourths of its land mass has no deed restrictions, Houston is not a good example of a
free market for land use, as its government routinely intervenes in land use decisions).
278
See EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 172–73; Staley, supra note 271.
279
See EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 172–73; Staley, supra note 271.
280
See EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 170; Staley, supra note 271.
281
See EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 172–73; Staley, supra note 271.
282
See, e.g., EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 175–78 (discussing the resulting autocentric dependency and sprawl); Michael Lewyn, How Overregulation Creates Sprawl
(Even in a City Without Zoning), 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1171, 1177–92 (2005) (explaining that
Houston has broken from “laissez-faire” development policies).
283
See, e.g., Bruce Katz & Julie Wagner, The Rise of Innovation Districts: A New
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repurposing of unused or underutilized buildings for “maker
spaces”;284
c. Allowing street curbside parking for customers, delivery
service personnel and sharing entrepreneurs’ work without
enabling local traffic to become gridlocked;
d. Flexible sign regulation for less obtrusive and standardized
building-exterior business identification plaques like QR
Codes; and
e. A credible punishment scheme for “defectors,”285 so that one’s
niche enterprise does not endure additional costs free-riders
escape paying, or endure the “guilt by association” with those
sharing producers regularly defecting from District norms.
VI. THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE REGULATION OF SHARING ENTERPRISES
Thoughtful sharing economy advocates seeking accommodation
with neighborhood dwellers should promote new types of selfregulatory organizations setting and enforcing basic regulations for
peer-to-peer sharing marketplaces and platforms,286 while
collaborating with public agencies on government oversight of
regulation enforcement.287 One such means is private certification,
Geography of Innovation in America, THE BROOKINGS INST. 2, 4–5, 9, 12 (May 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/metro/Images/Innovation/Innovat
ionDistricts1.pdf. Such districts address three of the main challenges of our time: “[a]
sluggish growth, national austerity and local fiscal challenges, [b] rising social
inequality, and [c] extensive sprawl and continued environmental degradation”; and
many districts are close to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. Id. at 2.
Further, such districts impact neighborhoods by creating new public spaces and
activating streets to draw people together, incidentally re-designing corridors to make
them more pedestrian-friendly. Id. at 17.
284
To incorporate “third spaces” as part of each new local development,
entrepreneurial incubators that transition sharing producers with “scalable” business
models to commercial offices or commerce park spaces outside the residential
neighborhood accomplishes two goals: maintaining residential character and
accelerating the sharing producer’s model. Most Districts have vacant buildings where
adaptive reuse presents the opportunity to make space available affordably to
entrepreneurs. See Widener, Tactical Urbanism, supra note 109.
285
See Schoenmakers, supra note 154, at 36 (explaining that “pool” or central
institutions’ sanctions can create a sufficiently strong selective pressure to prevent
cheating; and these institutions’ mere existence and visibility has some deterrent effect
on defection). The article’s authors claim that opportunists “always act as defectors in
the absence of the threat of punishment in the form of an effective sanctioning
system,” but become cooperators when the sanctioning institution, a “public signal,”
is supported by others who are stakeholders. See id. at 11–12.
286
See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 126–28.
287
See Sundararajan, supra note 130 (observing that industry consortiums for selfpolicing could inform emerging oversight questions as Sharing Enterprises achieve
scale, such as “whether residential zoning and noise laws should change when

WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE)

168

11/3/2015 2:56 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:111

where private entities assure that the products or the services they
certify meet criteria specified by the proper professional associations,
recognized standards-setting organizations and government
agencies.288
Sharing producers have superior knowledge of their means and
methods of producing goods and services. This superior knowledge is
vastly more than the knowledge of surrounding residents or of local
administrators who regulate land use, many of whom may view the
operations of Sharing Enterprises with suspicion or alarm. Logic
initially supports the idea of the sharing producers’ self-regulation, to
the extent they demonstrate capacity to implement standards earnestly
(including by incorporating inputs from District Councils) and
comprehensively. Private standards-setting has substantial history and
credibility. Consumers rely on private certification when purchasing
goods and services, while companies rely on such standardsconfirmation when choosing suppliers.289 Likewise, some government
agencies use certification to gauge regulatory compliance.290 Private
industry self-regulation is advantageous in responding to a market
failure or addressing novel, unanticipated consequences of new levels
of interdependence created by complex technologies and
globalization unfamiliar to traditional government operations.291
Business has much to gain from self-regulation when the reputation of
an industry sector or profession is at stake;292 this is the historical reason
for undertaking private standards-setting.
Reliable private certification addresses the market’s appetite for
certification293 without yielding to competitive pressures to “cut

individual apartments become mixed-use real estate”). See also Cohen & Sundararajan,
supra note 81, at 131 (arguing the need for governmental oversight). Of course, the
neighbors might seek to resolve such issues prior to a building’s conversion to
incorporate fully mixed-use business models. See also Lawrence J. Lad & Craig B.
Caldwell, Collaborative Standards, Voluntary Codes and Industry Self-regulation, 35 J. CORP.
CITIZENSHIP 67, 69, 71 (2009). In the case of land use regulation, the government must
serve as the enforcer of last resort. See supra text accompanying notes 169–77.
Additionally, collaboration overcomes most antitrust claims potentially arising from
alleged restraint of trade. See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 71.
288
See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 71. See also Timothy D. Lytton, Competitive
Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints That Frustrate
Government Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW. 539, 540 (2014).
289
See Lytton, supra note 287.
290
See id.; Miller, supra note 1 (noting that licensure enables collecting information
on licensees as well as being a means of regulating scofflaws).
291
See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 68.
292
See id. at 70.
293
Lytton, supra note 288, at 540.
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corners.”294 Fire safety certification by Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
of more than 20,000 different types of products made by 69,000
manufacturers295 and the Product Safety Code implementation process
under the Responsible Care Guiding Principles adopted by the
American Chemistry Council296 illustrate two types of private standardssetting and enforcement.297 Properly functioning reliable private
certification compares favorably to government regulation because the
former applies greater technical expertise.298 Indeed, many public
regulators rely on private standards to give their regulations more
credibility; often, government regulations incorporate a privateindustry standard by reference.299
Private certification provides superior inspection and monitoring
coverage of regulated entities when inspection and monitoring strain
public agency budgets.300 For private certifiers, inspection and
monitoring actions generate fees.301 “The income received from
inspection services prompts UL to inspect facilities at least four times
per year,” far more frequently than most government agencies can
afford.302 Certification is often more efficient than government
regulation. Because private certifiers are motivated to regulate
partially by industry demand, they are less likely than government
regulators to develop cost-inefficient standards where costs outweigh
the standards’ benefit to consumers. Additionally, private certification
is often more proactive and prospective than government regulation.303
Private product-safety certifiers typically anticipate problems and revise
standards in light of industry group experience;304 in contrast,
government regulators generally await demand for responsive rule294

Id. at 541.
Id. at 545–53.
296
See Responsible Care Product Safety Code, AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL,
http://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/Responsible-Care-ProgramElements/Product-Safety-Code (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
297
Cohen and Sundararajan would refer to these as SROs, distinguishing them
from trade organizations seeking to promote their industries’ well-being. An SRO, by
contrast, polices an industry “by formulating regimes of collective rulemaking in which
entities come together to develop, monitor, and, at times, enforce standards to govern
the behavior of members.” Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 124.
298
See Lytton, supra note 288, at 543, 545.
299
Id. at 564. To be sure, governments grant tacit approval to this process when
electing to have the private sector set standards on its own. See Lad & Caldwell, supra
note 287, at 76.
300
See Lytton, supra note 288, at 564.
301
Id. at 564.
302
Id..
303
Id. at 565.
304
See id. at 565–66.
295
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making.
Private certification may complement or compete with
government regulation.305 The relationship between them may change
over time.306 In matters of regulatory design, the important question
may be how to most effectively combine these pathways to establish a
problem-solving relationship in place of adversarial relations between
small business and government.307 One solution in the land use realm
may be to give sharing producers the election to comply with specific
public regulations in the municipal zoning code (subject to periodic
compliance inspections) or obtain certification from a private,
industry-sponsored agency (with periodic renewals). The latter option
permits confirming sharing producers meet or exceed industry
certification standards (including providing sufficient floor area to
accommodate employees, ample parking and delivery vehicle access
points to their places of business, fire and plumbing safety and
sanitation of internal operations, proper insurance coverage of
building and other improvements, and compliant business exterior
identification308) for operating their particular Sharing Enterprise.
Since industry certification standards can be tailored to address the
particular circumstances of a business type, the majority of sharing
entrepreneurs may prefer complying with particularized land-useoriented rules for their models of business operations. This
particularly is true as the number of Sharing Enterprise types
increases.309
Perhaps “therein lies the rub.”310 The current (and likely future)
challenge for self-regulation is structural. Few organized “trade
groups” exist among sharing producers, even while a few form
305

Id. at 542.
Lytton, supra note 288, at 542.
307
See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 73.
308
Of course, these standards cannot conflict with the community’s zoning
standards, thereby avoiding controversy over the proper means that meet mutually
agreed-upon ends of land use regulation, in the process reframing the standards as a
form of collaborative control. See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 78.
309
Likely no one can calculate how many sharing producers exist today. The
reason references to “shadow economy” and “underground economy” exist in popular
parlance is that many such businesses are not self-identifying, to avoid taxation and
other regulatory costs. See Cash Intensive Businesses Audit Techniques Guide—Chapter 8
The
Underground
Economy, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Apr. 2010),
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Cash-IntensiveBusinesses-Audit-Techniques-Guide-Chapter-8; Brad Plumer, The $2 Trillion Shadow
Economy Is the Recession’s Big Winner, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Apr. 23, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/04/23/americas-2trillion-shadow-economy-is-the-recessions-big-winner/.
310
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2.
306
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communities of interest on the Web.311 The rapid rate of this new
economy’s innovation outstrips the capacity to organize formal trade
groups like Underwriters Laboratories; and some sharing producers
have scant experience, time or other resources, or the disposition, to
form voluntary associations charged with credentialing their
“members.” Indeed, those in the vanguard of Sharing Enterprises
today may not represent tomorrow’s sharing producers. A “sector” of
enterprises may innovate so quickly, radically changing methods and
outputs, that the original vanguard is unqualified to pass judgment on
the quality, safety or other standards of scantly-later entrants into a
similar or “mutated” sector.
Since there are no convenient
categorizations of today’s sharing producers in terms of their outputs
of goods and services, interest communities must devote substantial
time and thought just to define a “sector” and determine which
producers (and their outputs) may have the knowledge to regulate
through standards-setting, again assuming they were disposed to set
standards for others.
Additional roadblocks are apparent to short-term private
certification of Sharing Enterprises. First, citizens unacquainted with
third-party private associations will not know how to report standards
slippage by a sharing producer operating in their enclaves.312 While
Sharing Enterprises may disclose on their building-exterior tags
311

In March 2015, a new trade body for the sharing economy, Sharing Economy
UK (SEUK), was launched to represent and champion the sharing producer sector
and ensure good business practices; its members include Airbnb, TaskRabbit and
Zipcar. See Susan McLean, The Rise of the Sharing Economy, 26 COMPUTERS & LAW
MAGAZINE OF SCL 1 (Apr./May 2015), available at http://www.mofo.com/~/
media/Files/Articles/2015/04/150401RiseoftheSharingEconomy.pdf. Peers.org is a
self-described “grassroots organization” launched in 2013 in Silicon Valley to
“mainstream, protect, and grow the sharing economy” by advocating for “smart
regulations.” See About, PEERS, http://www.peers.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 12,
2015); Tarun Wadhwa, The Sharing Economy Fights Back Against Regulators, FORBES (Sept.
16, 2013, 7:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ sites/tarunwadhwa/2013/09/16/thesharing-economy-fights-back-against-regulators-with-an-advocacy-group/ (“Peers is a
self-described ‘grassroots organization’ that launched last month to ‘mainstream,
protect, and grow the sharing economy.’”). But reports are that Peers.org’s funding
comes from “mission-aligned independent donors,” wealthy backers with a financial
interest in the advance of the sharing economy. In late 2014, Peers announced it
would re-direct its emphasis toward sharing economy workers. See Sarah Kessler, Peers
Says Its New Focus Is Helping Sharing Economy Workers, FASTCOMPANY TECHNOLOGY (Nov.
12, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3038310/peers-says-its-new-focusis-helping-sharing-economy-workers.
312
Nor will they have intimate knowledge of the standards themselves, unless the
resident is a member of the affected or similar Sharing Enterprise interest community.
Of course, the “where to report a complaint” dilemma may be resolved by requiring
that information to be posted on the platform of the Sharing Enterprise’s marketing
technology.
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contact information for the pertinent certifying body, not all residents
have the technological devices to “read” that information. In contrast,
most citizens know how to telephone or email their community’s
government. Second, with a variety of “sector” standards, there is a
clear danger of apparently inconsistent sanctions among trade groups
of miscreant sharing producers. This may undermine both producer
and citizen confidence in the private certification process and would
likely promote defections among sharing producers from established
norms. Third, it is unclear that the opportunity to be privately
regulated is sufficient inducement for Sharing Enterprise participation
in certification or oversight functions.
There is much to contemplate among all stakeholder groups in
outsourcing such regulation to private bodies, even for those believing
that entrepreneurs can best govern themselves, in opposition to
historically reactive local governments. Regardless, government
agencies ensuring land use compliance still must monitor activities of
certifying bodies in the appropriate Sharing Enterprise sectors.313
Private certification is not invariably reliable, and market competition
among certifiers sometimes results in diminished standards to reduce
costs of services and ease demands placed on clients.314 Enforcement
of zoning entitlements in any event will remain the job of local
governments. A pragmatic reason here is that a community ultimately
may be subject to claims of “regulatory taking” if private certification
sanctions incorporate closure of a Sharing Enterprise for violating de
facto land use regulations. Moreover, mere approval of a Sharing
Enterprise’s operation by a contracted private body over objections of
a District’s citizens may engender claims of due process denial since a
private entity’s performance of a public service may escape
constitutional restraints.315

313

Legally, land use regulation enforcement cannot be delegated altogether to
private bodies. See supra text accompanying notes 170–74. Additionally, government
may (in the background) threaten more severe regulation should self-regulation
processes not achieve the intended ends. See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 75.
314
Lytton, supra note 288, at 541.
315
See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Municipal Services, A Contagion in the Body
Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 41, 53–55 (1995).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Sharing producers are a part of the urban and suburban
economic landscapes and intend to remain so. Perhaps “New Cities
Scientists” hope that young entrepreneurs will be well-trained and
sufficiently imaginative to invent new business models that will be jobsgenerators and will populate transit-oriented, densely built, mixed-use
developments (so-called TOD zones) in municipal commercial cores
or along mass transit corridors.
Positioned there, issues of
neighborhood conflict among sharing producers, town planners and
dwellers perhaps will diminish to the point of easy resolution by a
single city department tasked with ad hoc conflict resolution.
Cleaving this idealism are facts and anecdotal evidence, starting
with an apparent shortage of youthful entrepreneurial persons eager
to occupy downtowns conveniently catalyzing every urban center’s
renaissance. Demographer Wendell Cox reports that from 2010 to
2013, the population of twenty- to twenty-nine-year-olds in core
counties (which usually are identical to the core city of the
metropolitan area) rose by about 3.4%,316 in contrast to the overall
increase nationwide of 4% of that age group in that same interval.
Despite the growth in raw numbers of twenty- to twenty-nine-year-olds
living in core counties, the share of the age group living in these areas
actually declined slightly, by 0.78%, compared to 2010.317 Meanwhile,
the share of the age group living in the less dense portions of
metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas increased. Overall,
roughly just 30% of all Millennials live in core counties; and in the
three years between 2011 and 2013, the number of Millennials outside
core counties increased by 1.28 million. In 2010, functional urban
cores, meaning those characterized by higher-density development
and greater reliance on transit, were home to 19% of the twenty- to
twenty-nine-year-olds in major metropolitan areas, a reduction from
20% in 2000. It appears that Richard Florida’s expectation, that a
majority of educated and theoretically committed “urbanite”
Millennials will gravitate to the diverse city cores of their preference,318
is suspect especially among those unemployed or out of the
316

See Wendell Cox, From Anecdotes to Data: Core & Suburban Growth Trends 2010–
2013, NEWGEOGRAPHY (May 23, 2014), http://www.newgeography.com/
content/004329-from-anecdotes-data-core-suburban-growth-trends-2010-2013.
317
Id.
318
See Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, WASH. MONTHLY (May, 2002),
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0205.florida.html.
Richard
Florida’s creativity rankings, which anchored material for many of his books, originally
appear in this Article, are a good précis of the body of his works on the Millennial
“Creative Class.”
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workforce and living in their parents’ homes. Additionally, Millennials
may well be living in suburban apartments where less expensive
inventory is readily available;319 while others at the oldest margin of this
generation may be starting families and buying houses, migrating
instead to the suburbs and smaller cities .320
According to survey data from Frank N. Magid Associates, young
Millennials already reside in the suburbs to at least the same extent as
older generations.321 The Magid data also suggests that this residential
preference likely will not change as the Millennial generation matures
and “settles down.” Once Millennials marry, their firm preference is
to live in a single-family home,322 atypical of hipster-urban settings such
as lofts, condos or apartments. Almost half of “settled” Millennials
(those who are married, many with children) own their homes. It
appears today that community—and family—orientation of the
Millennial generation will only reinforce the continued growth of
America’s suburbs. In the same vein, Joel Kotkin, author of The Next
Hundred Million, believes that a significant majority of the forthcoming
hundred million persons among Americans will make their homes in
what Kotkin calls “greenurbia,” the suburbs of tomorrow whose
dwellers rely less on major cities’ central business districts for jobs and
cultural amenities, as working from home becomes customary.323 In
319

See Laura Kusisto & Kris Hudson, Renters Are Majority in Big U.S. Cities, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/renters-are-majority-in-big-u-s-cities1423432009 (noting that rents are rising in many cities and rents outpace inflation
rates).
320
See April Lane, Why Millennials Are Moving to Suburbs and Smaller Cities, BENTLEY
PREPAREDU BLOG (May 21, 2015), http://www.bentley.edu/prepared/why-millennialsare-moving-suburbs-and-smaller-cities.
321
See MORLEY WINOGRAD & MICHAEL D. HAIS, MILLENNIAL MOMENTUM: HOW A NEW
GENERATION IS REMAKING AMERICA 196–201, 208 (2011).
322
See id. at 201.
323
JOEL KOTKIN, THE NEXT HUNDRED MILLION: AMERICA IN 2050 85–87, 234–37
(2011). Kotkin may be beating this drum too loudly, however. In his latest piece in
The Daily Beast, Kotkin stridently asserts (a) Jane Jacobs was wrong about diversity
characterizing today’s urban metropolis cores, and (b) the central city offers only a
temporary lifestyle for all but the wealthy and childless, thus roughly three-fourths of
Americans live in suburbs, especially when starting families, and will continue to do
so. See Joel Kotkin, What Jane Jacobs Got Wrong About Cities, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 1, 2015,
10:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/01/what-jane-jacobsgot-wrong-about-cities.html. Kotkin’s vision fails to account for (a) the rising tide of
student debtors among Millennials, (b) the volatility in vehicular fuels’ prices, and (c)
the availability of mortgages to persons affected by these first two phenomena, coupled
with underemployment, delaying marriage (compared to prior generations), and
spiking rental costs impairing saving for a down-payment. In their current
circumstances, youth on the workforce margins will live (and often work) where and
in what they can afford, often in their relatives’ abodes and in shared housing among
unrelated persons (locational preferences be hanged).
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short, the notion that sharing producers will concentrate in densely
urbanized pockets of cities may be illusory, while scattering throughout
the metropolis may be the continuing pattern of sharing producers for
some time.324
The business community, like demographic pundits, is conflicted
about the shortfall in entrepreneur supply. While the Wall Street Journal
reported in 2015325 resurgence in the preference to live and work
downtown, it concurrently reported a decrease in the ownership of
businesses by young adults struggling to find their niche in the
American workplace. Richard Florida himself observes that the
emerging micro-gig labor pool participants today identify more with
their occupation, skills or livelihood than with an employer, in part
due to what he calls “domain specific knowledge.”326 Florida believes
that Millennials and those generations following will define themselves
by their work’s creative content and their lifestyle interests instead of
by their career track or institutional affiliations.327 Why, then, might
most micro-business owners prefer occupying pricier downtown
districts? Perhaps the current circumstances embody Florida’s
observation that:
[People] have come to accept that they are completely on
their own—that the traditional sources of security and
entitlement no longer exist, or even matter. This is a sea
change . . . . The shift to self-motivation and personal
autonomy in the workplace is bound up with the fact that we
no longer take our identity from the company we work for,
but find it in the kind of work we do, our profession, our
lifestyle interests and the community we live in.328

324

See Philip Lawton, Michal Meczynski & Austin Barber, Policies Towards Place
Attraction and Policies for Place Retention, in PLACE-MAKING AND POLICIES FOR COMPETITIVE
CITIES 105, 110, 123 (Sako Musterd & Zoltán Kovács eds., 2013) [hereinafter MUSTERD]
(noting the “wide selection of living environments among the ‘creative class’ in
selecting a residential area”); Marco Bontje & Kaisa Kepsu, Creative Knowledge Strategies
for Polycentric City-Regions, in MUSTERD, supra note 324, at 191, 192, 200 (making like
observations).
325
Clarifying, “the same time” literally means the same day, January 3, 2015;
compare Eliot Brown, Young Drive an Urban Rebound, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2015, at A3,
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/young-drive-an-urban-rebound-1420250736,
with Ruth Simon & Caelainn Barr, Endangered Species: The Young Entrepreneur, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 3, 2015, at A1, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/endangeredspecies-young-u-entrepreneurs-004800314.html.
326
RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS AND HOW IT’S TRANSFORMING
WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 114 (2002).
327
Id.
328
Id. at 11516.
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In summary, the sharing entrepreneur producing goods and
services without a full time job or the intention to generate work for
employees is not temporary; these widely dispersed proprietors are
growing by magnitudes among the working age population.329 Sharing
producers are here to stay330 and communities must learn how they will
be integrated, not (conveniently) only into downtowns and other
mixed-use centers but throughout the general population in small
cities and villages331—and even in semi-rural areas. Such a role will not
be easy to discharge. Middle or upper class populations’ resistance to
reusing residentially-zoned property for new models of occupancy
entrenches support for existing zoning patterns.332 Historically, zoning
329

Derivative start-ups, where new entrants to the sharing economy “piggyback” on
the success of a growing business model, will accelerate in numbers, increasing the
growth potential of all Sharing Enterprises. See Charlie Wells, “Piggybackers” Hitch
Themselves to Airbnb, Uber, WALL ST. J. SMALL BUSINESS, Feb. 19, 2015, at B5, available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/piggybackers-hitch-themselves-to-airbnb-uber1424305849?mod=LS1. A plausible analogy is to the supply chain in the automobile
industry with “tiered” parts suppliers.
330
The single data point known as the “labor force participation rate” proves this
proposition. That term refers collectively to adults who are working or currently
seeking work. See Definition of Labor Force Participation Rate, DAVE MANUEL.COM,
http://www.davemanuel.com/investor-dictionary/labor-force-participation-rate/
(last visited Aug. 2, 2015). In June 2015, the American labor force, using raw jobs
numbers, grew by about 223,000 workers. See Gandel, supra note 43. That increase
effectively dropped the labor force participation rate to a tepid 62.6%of the workingage population, the lowest that rate has been since 1977. Id. The decline in the
participation rate accelerated in recent years in large part because many Americans
gave up searching for conventional forty-hour-per-week jobs. Id. And employed young
Americans are not earning higher wages in these new jobs. Id. These figures do not
mean, however, that younger workers have abandoned pursuing financial selfsufficiency. Those who cannot earn sufficient wages to be independent will seek
alternatives to reach their desired standard of living. While one alternative may be
“the dole,” another option for those more educated, capable of accessing the
implements of technology, may be to exploit social media and engage in one or
multiple Sharing Enterprise opportunities.
331
See generally Kris Hudson, Generation Y Prefers Suburban Home Over City Condo,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2015, at A2, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/millennialsprefer-single-family-homes-in-the-suburbs-1421896797?tesla=y&autologin=y
(discussing that the overwhelming majority of Millennials’ preference to reside in
inner-city suburbs may alter future demand for single-family homes); Neil Shah, Signs
of a Suburban Comeback, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702303749904579576440578771478?mg=reno64-wsj
(suggesting that the “bottoming out” of city growth may signify a resurgence of
suburban living). Alan Ehrenhalt sees, in the desire for an urban-seeking cohort of
Millennials, a possible trend to “urbanize the suburbs,” building new fulcrums of
activity by densifying suburban “retrofits.” See EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 208–17.
332
See supra text accompanying notes 209 & 210; cf. Simon Vallee, Zoning’s SelfDefense Mechanism: When Local Democracy Is Local Tyranny, URBAN KCHOZE BLOG (Apr. 29,
2014, 1:10 AM), http://urbankchoze.blogspot.com/2014/04/zonings-self-defensemechanism-when.html (arguing that attempts to change zoning are better submitted
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has been calculated in residential districts to establish homogeneous
neighborhoods; thus, inserting a new sharing producer business
model either requires a change in the property’s zoning category or
some form of zoning adjustment. Non-residents typically have little
voice in this discussion, since modifying a zoning map to introduce
new types of housing occupancy benefits only non-residents (i.e.,
potential future occupants). “Local-only democracy” customs further
ensure that any entitlement proposed to introduce a new use engages
few, if any, local supporters.333 Meanwhile, as local (incumbent)
residents seemingly will not benefit directly from the entitlement
proposal, these residents form either (i) an opponents’ group (among
those for whom the proposed zoning modification is potentially or
actually disadvantageous) or (ii) a disinterested group (whose
members do not share the opponents’ views or are simply apathetic).334
The opponents’ group often becomes strident, or even irrational,
about the proposed modification335 (unless they become better
informed) fearing change in the familiar but segregated,
homogeneous neighborhoods they occupy. In any case, those loudest
voices in the debate invariably oppose the initiative, as proponents
usually are not current residents and therefore are not “invested” in
the District.336 Even if opponents constitute a minority of all District
dwellers, since its real majority more often than not is disinterested,
opponents may stymie the initiative, essentially exercising “veto
power.”337 This inclination has exceptions, such as in conditions where
neighbors are poor and lack influence but are facing politically
influential developers who want a zoning change, or where project
leaders induce local residents to drop their opposition through the
through local democracy because local residents have input (albeit perhaps more in
theory than in practice) on whether zoning changes are made). In the current
climate, “battle lines” are drawn in some neighborhoods between those who “value
stability more than flexibility: middle-aged professionals with children to educate and
mortgages to pay,” versus “people who value flexibility more than security: students
who want to supplement their incomes; bohemians who can afford to dip in and out
of the labour market; young mothers who want to combine bringing up children with
part-time jobs; the semi-retired, whether voluntarily so or not.” Irving Wladlawsky
Berger, The Rise of the On-Demand Economy, WALL ST. J. CIO JOURNAL (Mar. 13, 2015,
12:04
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/03/13/the-rise-of-the-on-demandeconomy/.
333
See Vallee, supra note 332.
334
See id.
335
See John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law
Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 1, 16 (2006) (noting the “instinctive, rather than
thoughtful, reaction”).
336
See Vallee, supra note 332.
337
See id.
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developer’s creating or improving public parks, plazas, or other
amenities in exchange for their silence.338
Districts must decide to ban or accommodate these proprietors,
as will local governments’ land-use administrations. Districts should
retain the right to their predominantly residential character. City
planners need capacity to inventory home occupations and makerspaces within District boundaries, and consistent with ranges
prescribed by regulation, to avoid overwhelming magnitudes of nonresidential uses. And where necessary, temporary moratoria may be
appropriate pending closure of sufficient numbers of sharing
producer sites.339 District Councils assessing these inventories, aided by
city planning staff, are entitled to maintain balance among residential
dwellers, conventional retailers, office providers and sharing
producers, to retain a neighborhood “feel.”340 Local government
employees should maintain the District’s flow of information, using
platforms like Nextdoor (private District social networks)341 or
Neighborhood Link (a website platform)342 to maintain current
information on District entitlement actions, building permit
processing, and current or pending business licenses.
Those
municipal employees must acquire vital skills to explain the processes
of sharing provider licensure and zoning entitlement to stakeholders
and to moderate passionate conversations of disputants struggling over
the introduction of unconventional “business models” into
traditionally residential neighborhoods.343
In one regard, this quest for accommodation foments a struggle
among generations; a struggle between established neighborhood
dwellers and youthful sharing producers seeking to house their
business operations in a historically “improper” zoning district.344
338

See id.
See supra Part IV.C.
340
See Miller, supra note 1, at 45 (arguing that a working committee to draft
regulations should include representatives of the relative “interest groups” in the
enclave).
341
See NEXTDOOR, https://nextdoor.com/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2015).
342
See NEIGHBORHOOD LINK, http://www.neighborhoodlink.com/ (last visited
Aug. 2, 2015).
343
Cf. Nolon, supra note 335, at 33 (describing trained local land-use leaders in the
Hudson Valley facilitating “concept committees” involving stakeholders). See Miller,
supra note 1, at 45 (asserting that working committees to establish regulations must
incorporate cross-section of stakeholders).
344
See Henry B.R. Beale, Home-Based Business and Government Regulation, SBA OFFICE
OF ADVOCACY 72 (2004), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/articles/Home%
20Based%20Business%20and%20Government%20Regulation.pdf (“A home-based
business is a commercial (or borderline industrial) land use in a residential
neighborhood. In the past, the conflict between commercial land use and residential
339
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From another perspective, the general prohibition on entrepreneurial
models in residential zoning districts undermines efforts to remake the
social landscape of some urban communities, especially those mired in
joblessness, crime and other indicia of disorder.345 Some invested in
the sharing economy argue that today’s good land use decisions
demand subordinating individual inconvenience to the new business
climate’s benefit to the larger community—the so-called “greater
good.”346 This argument is premised on the authentically evolved
successes of walkability and sustainability dimensions—products of
what Chuck Wolfe describes as “unpredictable, disjointed and
overlapping,” thrown-together land use patterns—in contrast to an
artificially prescriptive or planned environment.347
Conflict will surely expand if regulations disadvantaging everyday
citizens thwart the emerging, “wired-up city” of sharing producers.348
This does not suggest imminent Sharing Enterprise-coerced
neighborhood occupancy. More likely, their producers will organize
via social media to get their message to their supporters and to
regulators in familiar and new forms of lobbying.349 More disturbing,

land use has been resolved by prohibiting home-based businesses.”).
345
See Stephen Clowney, Invisible Businessman: Undermining Black Enterprise with
Land Use Rules, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1061, 1070–73 (2009) (arguing that black-owned
businesses, especially those operated by entrepreneurs, remain dormant in many
urban centers due to burdensome municipal land-use practices).
346
See, e.g., Roger Valdez, Community Based Land Use: From Individual Rights to
Community Rights, SEATTLE’S LAND USE CODE (Aug. 8, 2012), https://
seattleslandusecode.wordpress.com/2012/08/08/community-based-land-use-fromindividual-rights-to-community-rights. See also Stahl, supra note 169, at 962 (positing
that zoning decisions ought to incorporate some notion of the public good).
347
CHARLES R. WOLFE, Introduction, in URBANISM WITHOUT EFFORT (2013), available
at http://northwest.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/39/2013/05/Wolfe_
introduction.pdf.
348
Scott Kirsner, Dispatch from the Disruption Zone, BOS. GLOBE INNOVATION ECON.
BLOG (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/10/31/dispatchfrom-disruption-zone/j23NKZYrcBLdNm1DgOi96I/story.html (quoting Uber cofounder and Chief Executive Officer, Travis Kalanick).
349
Cf. Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE (Oct.
2014),
http://greattransition.org/publication/debating-the-sharing-economy#
sthash. mhZQT9V9.dpuf (illustrating the Peers.org collaborative attempting to build
a social movement of sharers); but see supra note 306 and accompanying text. Of
course, success in lobbying for any short-term regulatory change will depend in
significant part on whether the owners of numerous platforms for Sharing Enterprises
support such efforts. I acknowledge that a great number of first-generation enterprises
depend for survival on the backing of Silicon Valley’s so-called “one percent,”
consisting primarily of venture capitalists (opposed to crowd-funding). See Irving
Wladawsky-Berger, The Continuing Evolution of the On-Demand Economy, IRVING
WLADAWSKY-BERGER BLOG (July 21, 2015), http://blog.irvingwb.com/blog/2015/07/
the-continuing-evolution-of-the-on-demand-economy.html.
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some sharing producers will decide to operate undetectably whenever
possible, preferring an underground approach to their operations350
that stymies efforts to achieve peaceful co-existence. Little is gained
from substituting “what you don’t know won’t hurt you” for addressing
resulting infrastructure burdens or for elevating the residential quality
of the neighborhood. Since bending rules is a trait of human nature,351
sharing producers avoiding land use and licensing issues will prefer to
work in the shadows, thereby seeking to minimize taxes, fees and other
administratively imposed overhead items, avoiding entitlements, other
regulatory requirements and licensure.352 Many consumers will
cooperate in this endeavor, thereby lowering their costs of goods and
services.353
Perhaps venture capitalists will render moot the challenges
impeding Sharing Enterprise and neighbor détente. Invariably,
capitalism engages persons to serially monetize sharing economy
business models of the best output, extracting optimum value while
putting proprietor-scale sharing producers out of business.354 But
Jeremy Rifkin asserts American cities shortly will witness a surge in the
zero marginal-cost society,355 under which a collaborative commons will
be sustained by grassroots-owned “skinny platforms” resembling non-

350

See Schindler, supra note 10, at 32–34 (suggesting that some prosumers indeed
may prefer the thrill of an illegal alternative).
351
See ROBERT A. HINDE, BENDING THE RULES: MORALITY IN THE MODERN WORLD
FROM RELATIONSHIPS TO POLITICS AND WAR 197, 235–38 (2007).
352
See Schindler, supra note 10 at 20–21, 24, 32; Gene Johnson, Rethinking Legal Pot:
Washington, Colorado Face Unexpected Problems, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 3, 2015),
http://www.pressherald.com/2015/01/03/rethinking-legal-pot-washingtoncolorado-face-unexpected-problems/ (reporting that since recreational cannabis in
Washington is heavily taxed unlike “medical marijuana,” avoiding such tax (and pass
through of that burden to consumers) has led to unlicensed sales and increasing
numbers of registered medical users). See also supra text accompanying notes 15157.
Such defection explains why pool punishment ultimately may be inescapable,
regardless of what land use “permitting scheme” is implemented in a community.
353
See Johnson, supra note 352 (reporting that consumers enroll as “patients” for
medicinal cannabis products and buy from such clinics to avoid the higher price of
recreational marijuana caused by vendors passing through the tax burden).
354
Cf. Rory Cellan-Hones, JustPark and the Sharing Economy, BBC FUTURE BLOG
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28686606 (reporting Index
Ventures’ major investment in JustPark, a company that helps drivers look for a
parking space). As a sharing economy niche emerges outside its cloak of illegality,
established market participants will occupy and dominate the new market, since
barriers to entry are not high and its technology drivers are “commodified” for the
most part. Miller, supra note 1, at 17. Established market participants are equally as
eager to participate in the sharing economy market space as their sharing economy
counterparts are to share in the market space of the established market. See id. at 28.
355
See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY 16–25 (2014).
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profit cooperatives.356 Such an outcome insures that proprietors and
prosumers will play pivotal roles in sharing production and
consumption, forever changing the exclusive dwelling “feel” in
residential zoning districts. If that society comes to fruition, sharing
producers’ dispersal within enclaves and ongoing formation of new
technology-based businesses means Districts will best be served by
transparency in producer operations and enlightened administrative
regulation.
It seems likely that opposing factions in the sharing economy will
achieve eventual détente through a series of phases transitioning
through slow and deliberative dialog, perhaps not in precise linear
order.
In the first stage, everyday citizens will achieve an
understanding that a community’s economic and social
competitiveness requires that the needs of the sharing producer
accommodate those of residents. These citizens will recognize that the
most agile communities attract the most entrepreneurially inclined
persons with the potential to make the largest economic growth
contributions to a District—and that such persons ought to be
cautiously welcomed.
A second phase may be a period of
“coopetition,”357 where regulators seek to eliminate “win-lose
outcomes” in monitoring and enforcing rules enabling sustainable
community economic growth. In that period, master “plans” will yield
to master strategies nimbly adapting to changes in the environment
and economic conditions of a local community.358 For example, the
District may assist the Sharing Enterprise in identifying public halls
and meeting rooms, along with privately-owned public open spaces359
356

See id. at 13135, 145, 164–65; Nathan Schneider, Owning is the New Sharing,
SHAREABLE BLOG (Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.shareable.net/blog/owning-is-the-newsharing.
357
Instead of stakeholders assuming that their success must come at others’
expense (a zero-sum game result), through co-opetition entities competing in the
same industries act as if there is partial congruence of interests, such as by sharing
information and expertise. Transparency about motivations, agendas and goals of the
stakeholders develops as a result. See ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF,
CO-OPETITION 5, 98104 (1997).
358
TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 305 (quoting email from Michael Joroff, Senior
Lecturer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Urban Studies and
Planning, to Anthony M. Townsend, author of the book (Jan. 28, 2012)); see also
BARTON & GRANT, supra note 244, at 49 (describing common-ground exploration for
individual stockholders’ gain, a “consultative” process leading to recognition of shared
communities of interest).
359
See John King, S.F. Making Sure High-Rise Owners ID Hidden Public Spaces,
SFCHRONICLE.COM BAY AREA & STATE BLOG (Feb. 9, 2015, 11:50 AM),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/S-F-making-sure-high-rise-owners-IDhidden-6070126.php#/0 (pointing out that citizens do not always know the location
of accessible public spaces built by developers).
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within the District, in which work and customer meetings may occur.
They may also assist in locating cheap storage and workshop space for
sharing producer use.360 Concurrently, communities may embark
upon mediated collective bargaining361 for adopting changes in
regulations applicable to new sharing producer initiatives.
In a third evolutionary phase, community planners, aided by
technology, will assume new roles as input-gatherers, interpreters and
mediators.362 Neighborhood dashboards with real-time information on
public display will visualize patterns of change, featuring how these
patterns relate to forthcoming decisions concerning a proposed
project’s impact on traffic flow and pedestrian safety in its immediate
vicinity, and prompt citizen input via social media on how to mitigate
concerns.363 Planning “debates” will become fully deliberative because
all stakeholders are better informed through inputs of those affected
by the ultimate decisions reached.364 Crowdsourcing seems to be the
future architecture of comprehensive civic participation in such forms
of decision-making. Reaching greater sophistication in spatial
planning as a quality of life issue, neighborhoods will become test-beds
for sustainable-living “settlements.”365 These settlements’ occupants
become crucial participants in the bottom-up approach to designing
sustainable development that minimizes individual mechanical
transportation and non-renewable resource waste by integrating
harmonious living and working environments.366 Naturally, local
governments will need to continue delivering critical public services
with ample capacity and timeliness to all stakeholders,367 avoiding
favoritism towards any faction of a neighborhood at the expense of
another.
In the fourth phase of evolution, District Community Benefits
Agreements become convenient mitigation vehicles attending land-

360

See BARTON & GRANT supra note 244, at 115.
See Michael N. Widener, Bridging the Gulf, Using Mediated, Consensus-Based
Regulation to Reconcile Competing Public Policy Agendas in Disaster Mitigation, 74 ALB. L.
REV. 587, 613–27 (2011).
362
Cf. id. at 617–19 (explaining how scientists act as interveners in the mediation
process, both interpreting data and building trust among stakeholders).
363
TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 307.
364
Miller, supra note 1, at 24 (arguing that concepts of accommodation focusing
“solely on regulators and the disruptive market participant” will fail; but an approach
acknowledging the legitimate concerns of all stakeholders likely will yield results that
are fair to all, creating lasting community benefits).
365
See BARTON & GRANT, supra note 244, at 3–5.
366
See BARTON & GRANT, supra note 244, at 3–5.
367
See TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 309.
361
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use modifications for specific developments368; under these
agreements, Sharing Enterprises “pay it forward,” contributing to
neighborhood infrastructure like ICT upgrades or amenity upgrades
within the District.369 These agreements need to be reached directly
among persons most affected by the sharing producers’ activities and
those producers. These private stakeholders must collaboratively
substitute their judgments for planning elites having little sense of the
neighborhood’s immediate requirements. As Community Benefits
Agreements become progressively smaller in scope, public-private
development partnerships may slowly replace elaborate regulatory
codes and two-faction good neighbor contracts.370 Relatively benign
but purposeful regulatory overlays will become the norm, and
technology—capturing and analyzing Big Data—will make decisionmaking locally particularized and less “global” and, therefore,
increasingly more flexible.371 With universal transparency, a Web-like
operating system with open-access data affords property developers,
citizens and planning bodies a collaborative ability to design new
solutions in accommodating business models into residential areas.372
Providing essential services, at the election of the community, is left to
social networks of more intimately-scaled neighborhoods.373 Smart
368

See Courtney Elizabeth Knapp & Justin B. Hollander, Assessing the Potential for
Integrating Community Benefits Agreements into Brownfield Redevelopment Projects, in
RECLAIMING BROWNFIELDS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADAPTIVE REUSE OF
CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES 131 (Richard C. Hula, Laura A. Reese & Cynthia JacksonElmoore eds., 2012).
369
Cf. Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or
another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 25–26 (2010) (criticizing
the “diversion of benefits from the local government as a whole to the host
neighborhood,” by claiming it potentially creates greater inequality among the local
government’s neighborhoods). In the case of Sharing Enterprises, their owners might
incorporate in such CBAs the trading of their services to neighborhoods, instead of
paying for public amenities with cash, by creating local exchange and trading schemes.
See BARTON & GRANT, supra note 244, at 115. Ironically, sharing producers in the 3D
printing “business” may assist Districts in physically-enhanced modeling of new urban
planning initiatives. See T. Ghawana & S. Zlatanova, 3D Printing for Urban Planning: A
Physical Enhancement of Spatial Perspective, in URBAN AND REGIONAL DATA MANAGEMENT
211 (C. Ellul, S. Zlatanova, M. Rumor & R. Laurini eds., 2013), available at
http://www.isacsolutions.in/PDF/Modified3DPrintingandGISApplications.pdf.
370
See Miller, supra note 1, at 23 (“[I]f the city were to adopt a more flexible
[regulatory] approach . . . the city and its citizens could also become partners in
sharing the rewards of this risk tolerance.”).
371
See id.; TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 291.
372
See Miller, supra note 1, at 24 (discussing Sharing Enterprises’ acceptance as
viable, legal business ventures will find resolution only by engaging the full spectrum
of stakeholders interested in the sharing economy and its manner of changing
communities).
373
See TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 291.
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urban microprocessor-driven devices distributing aggregated data will
not undermine sociability, but will reinforce it, allowing cities to
thrive.374
An obstacle to reaching this fourth phase will be wresting enough
data from the sole ownership of companies bundling data as products
and services to be sold to cities.375 Cities must resist companies’
initiatives to lock them into contracts for proprietary services that
effectively cede control of such data to private interests.376 Cities need
to grow their own human infrastructure, enabling amateurs and small
entrepreneurs to experiment through computational “laboratories” to
work on future smart city technologies—a form of technology “literacy
movement,” building leadership networks of citizens. These networks
will gather and share data, modeling, software and hardware designs,
together with business models martialed for city joint problemsolving.377 Indeed, communities will need to join with the private sector
to build local capacity to develop municipal technologies toward
designing publicly-owned smart city solutions. Such development
partnerships may even engage groups of citizens or neighborhoods as
direct participants or investors.378
In the short haul, sharing entrepreneurs producing goods and
services without a full time job or generating employment for others
will grow in numbers. Communities must accommodate them not
merely into downtowns and other mixed-use, densely urbanized
centers, but throughout the general population. The permissions and
sanctions local authorities grant and impose are optimized when a

374

See id.
See id. at 294.
376
See id.
377
See id. at 301; Nolon, supra note 335, at 46–47. One British author urges her
national government to pilot a UK “sharing city,” in which residents are urged to share
as a daily routine and within which offices, residences and forms of transportation all
become assets for joint usage. See Debbie Wosskow, Unlocking the Sharing Economy: An
Independent Review, U.K. Dep’t of Bus. Innovation & Skills Ch. 5 (Nov. 2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3
78291/bis-14-1227-unlocking-the-sharing-economy-an-independent-review.pdf.
378
See Max Taves, Detroit Tiger Stadium Redevelopment Project Turns to “Crowdfunding,”
WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2015, at C6, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/detroitstiger-stadium-redevelopment-project-turns-to-crowdfunding1423610035?KEYWORDS=MAX+TAVES (using an online crowdfunding platform
selling preferred stock to local residents (and “unaccredited investors”) in order to
finance part of the equity for a mixed-use project). See also Andrew Blackman,
Crowdfunding Comes to Real Estate, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2014, at R3, available at
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303725404579459271078527790
(reporting new websites that allow individual investments in self-storage facilities and
hotels).
375
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District’s residents, dwellers, producers, and prosumers collaboratively
reinforce rules and join with public administrators in that governance
process. Redress against defectors from new operating norms must
include forms of peer- and pool sanctioning by sharing producers.379
This form of regulation affords a community its moment to sustain an
indigenous, organic, street-level culture central to all its citizens’
lives.380
APPENDIX: LEXICON
Big Data: The manipulation of large data sets generated by
persons and maintained by computers and by the Internet of Things
to drive decision-making.
Citizens: Persons living in the neighborhood who are affected by,
whether or not customers and clients of, sharing producers.
Community Benefits Agreements: Agreements between the sharing
entrepreneur class and the residential neighborhoods that establish
ground rules for sharing producers to operate businesses in residential
areas and the quid pro quo payable for that privilege.
Districts, or Enclaves: Areas of a community aided by large datasets
that mine resident information and statistics in useful chunks and
matrices to reach land use regulation decisions affecting those living
and working within the area. A “district” or an “enclave” as easily could
be called a neighborhood, a village or a hamlet; it means a subset of
the overall community small enough to lend itself to greater local
inputs or, in the rare instance, to control over entitlements decisions.
Euclidean Zoning: A zoning scheme that rigidly defines permitted
uses in each of several zoning districts, initially created to segregate
residential from non-residential uses.
ICT: Collectively, information and communications technologies,
all depending on broadband or telecommunications servers.
Micro-Jobbers: A subset of sharing entrepreneurs akin to the
medieval “journeyman” that offers their services to businesses
involving leveraging of technology, including software coding, but also
“making” with the use of technology, such as via 3D printing and
similar software-driven replication, on a daily or hourly basis without
any form of permanent alliance with any particular business.
Millennials: Younger Americans born roughly between 1983 and
379

Cf. Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 129 (underscoring the value of
including sharing producer platforms “as enforcers of the self-regulatory solution”).
380
See JACOBS, supra note 26, at 117–25, 133–40; see also FLORIDA, supra note 326, at
148–54, 281–82, 329–31.
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2003.
Peer and Pool Punishment: When certain people start reaping
benefits of a common good without paying a share of the efforts of the
group, these exploiting individuals are known as “free-riders.” Freeriding behavior is frequently sanctioned in society by punishment.
Delivery of punishment by individuals (peer punishment) is itself
susceptible to free-riding; that is, other individuals benefit from the
“punisher’s” efforts without participating in the cost of punishment
delivery. Those non-contributors to the punishment’s delivery are
known as “second-order free riders.” Pool punishment occurs (in
contrast to peer punishment) when individuals contribute to a
“punishment pool;” then, the punishment is delivered to exploiters
(free-riders) by an actor funded by its contributors. This cost-sharing
occurs even when exploiters do not existtherefore, even in the
absence of punishment.381 The mere presence of the pool-punishment
actor is a signal that induces cooperation (and thereby likely reduces
free-riding). So, a zoning enforcement agency in a community,
funded by taxpayers to enforce the zoning ordinance against defectors
from its rules, is a type of a punishment pool.
Prosumer: A consumer who becomes a “product and brand
advocate.” Rather than simply consuming products, prosumers are the
“voices” of those products, significantly impacting the success or failure
of companies, products, and brands, particularly through their
involvement on the social web. Members of the social web—bloggers,
micro-bloggers, forum posters and social networking participants who
spread messages, influence people around the world and drive
demand.
Sharing Enterprises: The niche businesses established by sharing
producers.
Sharing Producers: The entrepreneurial class that, through niche
marketing using Web 2.0 technologies and social networking
platforms, sells goods and services without a visible store front or office
location; micro-jobbers are one type of such entrepreneurs, except
their services alone are for sale, frequently on a single engagement
(“one-off”) basis. Some sharing producers are creating, meaning they
produce new goods from their assets; others are extracting, meaning
they derive value from their existing assets (such as from their vehicles,
as drivers, or from their real property, as short-term innkeepers).
Some are independent contractors; others are so-called “dependent
381

See Todd Bodnar & Marcel Salathé, Governing the Global Commons with Local
Institutions, PLOS (Apr. 3, 2012), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?
id=10.1371/journal.pone.0034051.
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contractors,” such as persons who “drive for” Lyft, for instance, because
these producers do not operate their own Web-driven business
model.382
Zoning Adjustment: Use permits (sometimes known as “special
exceptions”) and area/dimensional variances, as well as zoning
ordinances interpretations, any of which processes may result in
“permission” to establish certain types of uses including Sharing
Enterprises.

382

See Christopher Mims, How Everyone Gets the ‘Sharing’ Economy Wrong, WALL ST. J.
TECH (May 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-everyone-gets-the-sharingeconomy-wrong-1432495921.

